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INTRODUCTION

This Article marks a notable anniversary for its authors. Ten
years ago, in 1998, we celebrated the publication of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, on which we served as coReporters,' and we coauthored and published an article claiming that
American courts had reached a consensus regarding the standard by
which to judge whether a product design is defective.' This Article
reviews what has happened in the decade since then and concludes that
t Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
B.S., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1970; J.D., Marquette University, 1965; A.B., Beth
Medrash Elyon Research Institute, 1962. James A. Henderson, Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School. Princeton University, A.B. 1959; Harvard University, LL.B. 1962, LL.M 1964.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Brooklyn Law School students Joshua
Fox 2010, Michael Gilman 2010, Herwin Jorsling 2010, Zachary Lisabeth 2010, Jonathan Selkowe
2010, Steven Sternschein 2009, and Cornell Law student, Alexander Coedo 2010. Professor Twerski
acknowled es the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Fund for this Article.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
2 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 868-72, 887, 893-901 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson &
Twerski, Achieving Consensus].
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we got it right the first time. Beyond simply sharing our current research
with the reader, we want to shed some new light on how the Restatement
came to be the way it is and to explain how and why the consensus we
described earlier remains rock solid. The Restatement project and the
consensus article are linked because the standard that virtually all
American courts use in judging product designs is the one we included in
section 2(b) of the Restatement-whether the defendant manufacturer
could have adopted a safer alternative design and whether failure to do so
"renders the product not reasonably safe."3 As this Article explains, trial
courts vary somewhat (though less now than ten years ago) in what they
say to juries; and appellate courts vary somewhat (less now) in the
rhetoric they use to write their opinions; but in the overwhelming
majority of American jurisdictions, claims of defective design reach
triers of fact only when the plaintiff offers plausible proof that her
injuries would have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design.4
II.

THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)

When we started work as co-Reporters in 1992, we understood
that the products liability project would address a number of issues that
would, in varying degrees, be controversial. How should component
parts suppliers be treated?5 Commercial used-product sellers?6 How
should crashworthiness claims be sorted out?7 Should a robust post-sale
duty to warn be implemented?8 We knew that each of these issues would
generate vigorous debate and controversy. But we also knew that none
would surpass in intensity the controversy surrounding the proper
standard for defective product design. The reason for this had more to do
with rhetoric than substance. For thirty years, American courts across the
country had been applying a fault-based risk-utility standard in reviewing
the defectiveness of product designs. 9 But over the same period, most of
these courts had been explicitly referring to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which trumpeted strict liability as the

3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
4 See infra Part IV.
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 2(b) (1998).

§ 5 (1998).
6 Seeid.§8.
7 Seeid.§ 16.
8 Seeid.§ 10.
9 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TwERsKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 177-78 (6th ed. 2008); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.4
(2005) [hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW]. See generally Sheila L. Birnbaun,
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980).
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operative rule." So long as the inherent contradiction between applying a
fault standard to determine liability and using strict liability rhetoric to
explain the outcome continued unchallenged, all had gone smoothly
enough. But to come along in a new Restatement and point out the
obvious inconsistency would seem, to those who truly believed in the
myth of strict liability, nothing short of heresy.
Another aspect of developing an acceptable standard for
defective design would have to be addressed. Even if we could count on
reasonable minds to see that the operative standard for defective design
was rooted in risk-utility balancing, it was not so clear that reasonable
minds would agree that only a marginal, rather than an aggregative,
approach would be acceptable. Marginal risk-utility analysis asks
whether the manufacturer could have adopted a safer, cost-effective
version within the broader category of design into which the defendant's
product falls; aggregative risk-utility asks whether the risks of the
broader category outweigh, in the aggregate, the category's social utility.
Under category liability, even inherently, unavoidably unsafe product
designs that cannot be redesigned to be significantly safer may be
deemed defective if their aggregate risks are found to outweigh their
aggregate utilities. We knew that American courts have never imposed
category liability for very good reasons." but we were concerned that an
unintended consequence of convincing ALl members that risk-utility, not
strict liability, was the operative standard for defective design would be
to give category liability new-found (and undeserved) respectability.
A.

Recognizing a Fault-BasedStandardfor Defective Design

The first task we undertook as Reporters was to divide the
concept of product defect into three subcategories that American courts
had come to recognize: (1) manufacturing defects, (2) design defects, and
(3) failures to warn (marketing defects).1 2 The drafters and promoters of
section 402A in the early 1960s had relied almost entirely on
manufacturing defects which, because they could be defined
mechanically without reference to notions of unreasonable risk, could
serve as the basis for strict liability. Because the drafters of section
402A had in mind only manufacturing defects, they saw no reason to
distinguish among the other types of defects to which their strict liability
10See, e.g.,

Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (applying

an "unreasonably dangerous" risk-utility test for defective design, the court insists it is imposing
"strict liability" under section 402A).
I See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263
(1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier];David G. Owen, Toward a Proper
Testfor Design Defectiveness: "Micro Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 (1998).
13 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 7.2.
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rule might apply. 14 To be sure, the drafters of section 402A appear also to
have relied on a special subset of design defects involving products that
malfunction, thereby failing to perform their manifestly intended
function in a self-defeating manner. 5 In those special design cases the
defects are functionally equivalent to manufacturing defects, so strict
liability works as well for them. Indeed, manufacturing and design
malfunction defects may be said to disappoint consumer expectations
and thus may be deemed defective on that basis. By contrast, courts
generally dealt with failures to warn under the negligence rubric, often
outside the bounds of section 402A. 6 After all, the defendant's "failure"
to provide adequate warnings carried with it a built-in negligent quality
not involving any shortcoming inherent in the product itself. So far, so
good. The critical analytical error that many courts and commentators
made in the post-section 402A developmental period was to assume that
product designs that were unreasonably dangerous, but neither selfdefeating nor prone to malfunction, could be dealt with under the same
section 402A strict liability rubric as could manufacturing defects and
malfunctioning, self-defeating designs. Because virtually no such17
mainstream design cases reached juries in the 1960s and early 1970s,
the incoherence of purporting to hold manufacturers strictly liable for
their negligent design choices did not surface.s Observers of the
developing American products liability system simply assumed that the
strict liability rule in section 402A applied not only to manufacturing
defects but to all manners of design defects, as well.
As mainstream design cases' 9 began to reach juries in greater
numbers in the 1970s and 1980s, many courts came to understand that a
fault-based, reasonableness standard was necessary with which to
determine design defects. But the "strict liability under section 402A"
rhetoric persisted, notwithstanding the underlying reality that fault of the
manufacturer was the determinative consideration. Thus, the two
significant implications of dividing the defect concept into its three
separate constituents were (1) the requirement that we squarely face the
question of what the basis of liability should be for mainstream, "classic"
14 George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The OriginalIntent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.

2301, 2303 (1989).
15 See Michael D. Green, The UnappreciatedCongruity of the Second and Third Torts
Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807 (2009).
16 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1990) [hereinafter
Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse].
17 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1546-52 (1973) [hereinafter
Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices]; Henderson & Twerski,
Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 891.
18 See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984); Birnbaum, supra
note 9, at 600-01.
19 We have referred to design cases not involving product malfunction as "classic"
design cases. See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 876-77.
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design defects; and (2) the necessity that we bring failure to warn cases,
clearly resting on risk-utility balancing, within the umbrella concept of
product defect. The first of these implications is of primary interest here.
We have dealt with the second elsewhere. 20 At the outset, we were
tempted to recognize that classic design defects reflected negligence on
the part of the manufacturer in parallel fashion to failure to warn. But we
knew that many courts were deeply committed to section 402A's "strict
liability" rhetoric, and might reject the new Restatement out-of-hand for
that reason, without giving it a fair hearing.2 So we decided to capture in
plain words the essence of Learned Hand's classic formulation for
negligence, 22 in which the plaintiff must show that a precaution (an
alternative design) could have been adopted at acceptable costs (failure
to adopt renders the defendant's product not reasonably safe), and that
failure to adopt the precaution caused the plaintiffs injuries. The black
letter of the new Restatement makes no mention of "negligence" or
"fault;" it leaves such language to the comments.23 Thus, under the new
Restatement, a court is free to adopt or reaffirm the substantive, riskutility standard that American courts had been applying for decades prior
to our work and at the same time continue to insist that manufacturers are
strictly liable for harm caused by design defects. 4 Of course, nothing
prevents courts from embracing the risk-utility standard openly; by now,
a majority of courts have done exactly that. But nothing in the
Restatement forces courts to do so.
Observe that the distinction here drawn between risk-utility
balancing and strict liability is not bridged merely by holding the
manufacturer responsible for time-of-trial knowledge of risk and riskavoidance technology that may not have been available at the time of
original sale. Although doing so could be characterized as imposing
"strict liability" in the sense that the manufacturer might not have been
negligent in failing to discover risk and risk-avoidance information that
was unknowable at time of sale, the standard for judging the design
nevertheless involves risk-utility balancing at time of trial. Although
most American courts do not hold product sellers responsible for
information not available at time of sale,25 even the small minority that
do are committed to judging product designs based on risk-utility
balancing.
A true non-risk-utility approach to holding manufacturers liable
for the generic risks presented by their products would be to hold them
liable for all the harm their products cause-to let actual causation
20 See Henderson & Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse,supra note 16.
21 We did not want to be remembered, fairly or not, as "the guys who tried to kill strict

products liability."
22 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, d (1998).
24 See id. § 2 cmt. n.
25 See HENDERSON & TwERSKi, supra note 9, at 197-99, 341-52.
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determine liability. Elsewhere we have referred to such an approach as
"enterprise liability"26 and have argued that it would be unworkable. Not
only is actual causation an inadequate basis for sorting out claims in
court-without a requirement of defect, everything ends up being a cause
in fact of everything else-but also no one could insure against the
relevant losses because of high levels of moral hazard-product users
would have inadequate incentives to use products carefully.27 Not
surprisingly, our courts have never adopted such an approach, or even
considered it seriously.28 But what a number of courts have considered is
basing design-based liability on the disappointment of consumer
expectations. Historically, such an approach traces its pedigree to
comment i to section 402A, in which the drafters justified their new rule
of strict liability by pointing to the disappointment of consumer
expectations that defect-caused product failures cause.29 Earlier in this
analysis we explained how manufacturing defects and self-defeating
designs trigger product malfunctions that disappoint expectations of safe
product performance. That is clearly what the drafters had in mind when
they authored comment i. But if the courts were to extend the consumer
expectations concept to include situations in which products perform
exactly as intended but nonetheless cause injury, a form of strict,
enterprise liability would be achieved. Even if the accident could not
have been avoided cost-effectively by redesigning the product, liability
could be imposed because the mere fact that the product caused injury
could be found to have disappointed consumer expectations of safe
product usage.
Of course, this new expectations-based rule of quasi-enterprise
liability would not require the imposition of liability upon a showing that
the defendant's product caused harm. Under a true enterprise liability
approach, causation, alone, would require the imposition of liability, but
not here. To impose liability under the approach being considered here,
in addition to a finding of causation, the trier of fact would also be
required to find that the happening of the accident disappointed
consumer expectations. Presumably, if the product-related risks were
fairly obvious, a jury could conclude that a product did not disappoint
expectations even if it helped to cause a terrible accident.3" Bearing in
mind that jurors, in determining whether expectations were disappointed,
draw on their own life experiences rather than rely on proof adduced by

26 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.377
passim (2002); see also Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1276-97.
27 See Henderson, supra note 26, at 390-400.
28 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices, supra note

17, at 1554; see also Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1292, 1296-97.
29 See HENDERSON & TwERSKI, supra note 9, at 254-69.
30 See id. at 269-78.
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the parties,3 it would not be unfair to characterize such a quasi-enterprise
liability approach as one based on the jury's whim.32
This foray into the possibility that courts might pursue a quasienterprise-liability, "jury's whim" approach to design defects based on
the disappointment of consumer expectations would seem puzzlingly
unnecessary save for one critical fact-that is exactly the path that critics
of the Restatement project have pursued in opposing the adoption of a
risk-utility, reasonable-alternative-design approach to defective design.
Besides knowing full well when we began work as Reporters that the
operative design defect standard in most states was fault-based riskutility balancing, we were also aware that a minority of states insisted
that the operative standard was the disappointment of consumer
expectations.33 Without having yet undertaken a thorough canvassing of
all states, we had assumed that no jurisdiction would knowingly embrace
an amorphous, jury-whim approach and that one or more of the
following explanations accounted for all such judicial references to
consumer expectations: (1) references to "reasonable expectations"
incorporated risk-utility balancing, and thus the standard to which courts
referred was, in actuality, a fault-based standard; (2) the courts that
referred to consumer expectations did so only in the context of selfdefeating designs that caused products to malfunction; or (3) even if the
references to expectations were not limited to reasonable expectations,
and even if the references were made in the context of classic design
litigation not involving product malfunctions, trial courts sent design
claims to juries only when plaintiffs produced credible proof of
reasonable alternative designs that would have avoided the plaintiffs'
harm.
In addition to these common-sense assumptions regarding the
prevailing case law, we also knew that virtually every major torts scholar
who had looked carefully at the issue of design defect over the past
several decades had embraced risk-utility balancing and had rejected the
consumer expectations test as unworkable and unwise.34 A small handful
of writers, including two who wrote advocacy pieces only after the
31 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305-06 (Cal. 1994).
32

See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in

ProductDesign Litigation:An Essay on ProximateCausation,88 GEO. L. J. 659, 681 (2000).
33 See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying
text.
34 See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 611-18; Mary J. Davis, Design Defect
Liability:
In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1235-37 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, ProductsLiability: The Searchfor the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REv. 643, 649-52 (1978);
Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48
VAND. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1995); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the
Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 300-05 (1979); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated:
Exploding the "'Strict"Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 760-61; William Powers
Jr., A Modest Proposalto Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 64647, 65254; Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProductsLiability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 478-81
(1979); John Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551,
566-71 (1980).
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Restatement revision project was well under way, urged adoption of the
consumer expectations test. These authors insisted that the risk-utility
standard lacked support in the case law and placed an unfair burden on
plaintiffs by requiring them to provide technical proof that a safer, harmpreventing alternative design would have been feasible. 5 The consumer
expectations test was fair, they argued, because all that it required
plaintiffs to prove was that the product, even if reasonably safe, had been
instrumental in causing them to suffer harm.
Lending an aura of plausibility to these otherwise implausible
anti-risk-utility arguments was the fact that the Supreme Court of
Connecticut purported to reject the Restatement's reasonable-alternativedesign standard in 1997, while we were still working with a tentative
draft of the relevant section. The plaintiff in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co.,36 an industrial injury case, had proven several alternative
designs and clearly would have reached the jury under the Restatement
rule; the issue on appeal was how to instruct the jury after a trial almost
entirely devoted to how the defendant could have designed the product
more safely so as to avoid causing the plaintiff injury.37 Although a
majority approved an opinion that explicitly rejected the new
Restatement's approach in the abstract, it recognized an exception for
complex cases that came so close to actually embracing the
Restatement's approach that a concurring justice chastised the majority
for seemingly contradicting itself.3" At the time, the Connecticut decision
seemed so out of place in the factual context of the actual case as to
appear artificially contrived in an effort to embarrass the Restatement
project. Interestingly, our recent research for this Article reveals that no
plaintiff in a reported case in Connecticut has ever reached the jury in a
classic design case without proving that a safer, reasonable alternative
design was available at time of sale.39 It thus appears that the Connecticut
high court could not have meant what it said in 1997 about there being
no requirement that the availability of an alternative design be proven.
But there it was-the Connecticut Supreme Court had gone out of its
way to reject the tentative draft of our section on design defect. We could
35 Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project,48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 665-68 (1995); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable AlternativeDesign Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1407 (1994). In a more recent article, Douglas Kysar argues that the consumer expectations test as
advocated by the critics of the Products Liability Restatement is too amorphous and vague but sets
forth a consumer expectations test based on scientific and behavioral testimony of experts. Douglas
A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003). The authors responded
in James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Consumer Expectations Last Hope: A Response to
ProfessorKysar, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1791 (2003).
36"694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
37 See id. at 1324-25.
38 See id. at 1356 (Berdon, J., concurring) ("[A]dopting such a risk-utility test for
'complex product designs' sounds dangerously close to requiring proof of the existence of 'a
reasonable alternative design,' a standard of proof that the court properly rejects today.").
39 See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
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only hope that our reasoning and our research would persuade the
American Law Institute membership that Connecticut's contrived,
abstract essay in support of a consumer expectations test had gotten it
dead wrong.
The end-result of all these deliberations was section 2(b), which
requires the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer could have adopted a
reasonable alternative design and that failure to do so renders the product
not reasonably safe. Comment g to section 2 states explicitly that
disappointment of consumer expectations, while relevant, does not
provide an independent basis on which to find that a product design is
defective.4" A Reporter's Note explains that, while a small minority of
states purport to adopt the consumer expectations test, a clear majority
rely on a risk-utility/reasonable-alternative-design standard to determine
whether a design is defective. 4
B.

ProtectingAgainst Category Liability

The second major aspect of the Restatement's treatment of
liability for defective design concerned the need to protect against the
possibility that the risk-utility approach would invite courts to condemn
as defective entire categories of inherently dangerous products, even if
those products could not be redesigned to be made safer.42 The idea
behind category liability was that, under a negligence regime, a
manufacturer could be found at fault for distributing certain inherently
risky products in the first instance, even if those products could not be
designed differently so as to make them safer.4 3 For example, alcoholic
beverages must, almost by definition, contain alcohol to be attractive to
those who desire to consume such products. Removing the alcohol does
not merely make such beverages safer for those who consume them
abusively, it also destroys their utility for everyone, including the
significant majority who do not abuse them. American courts have never
imposed category liability, mainly because they intuitively (and
correctly) understand that it would constitute an abuse of judicial power
to decide which broad categories of products should not be distributed at
all. Such sweeping regulation, courts have concluded, should be left to
legislatures to undertake." But if the new Restatement were overtly to
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).
See id. § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. d, II.C.-D. (1998).
See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
43 Some advisers likened this form of distributor's negligence to negligent entrustment.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).
44 See, e.g., Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 855 N.Y.S.2d 119,
124-26
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (claim that negligent product design of regular cigarettes based on
availability of "light" cigarettes with lower tar and nicotine was dismissed because "light" cigarettes
are not a substitute for regular cigarettes and to impose liability would declare a whole category of
HeinOnline -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1069 2008-2009
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embrace a risk-utility standard in broad terms, we feared that our
formulation might invite courts to look more kindly on the proposition
that certain categories of products are sufficiently dangerous that it
would be negligent to distribute them in the first instance.
Besides lawyers who represent plaintiffs in products liability
litigation, who would have been delighted to see our Restatement project
endorse the idea that broad categories of inherently risky products might
be deemed defective even if no alternative designs could have reduced
the risks, two groups of American Law Institute constituents with
seemingly more objective, disinterested viewpoints supported
formulations that we believed might encourage courts to embrace
category liability. The first group urged us to replace the more specific,
reasonable alternative design standard for defect with the broader
principle of designs that presented unreasonable risks, and then explained
in a comment that the best way to prove that a product design's risks
were unreasonable would be to prove that a reasonable, safer alternative
design could have been adopted.45 The other group of seemingly
disinterested critics urged that we include in the black letter explicit
language making clear that a manufacturer could be found to be at fault
for distributing certain highly-though-unavoidably-risky product designs
in the first instance.46 We resisted these suggestions on the ground that
the clear implication would have been that a category of products might
be found to present unreasonable risks even if those risks were not
avoidable by the adoption of a safer alternative.
In the end, we responded to the entreaties from both of these
camps of disinterested, otherwise supportive critics by retaining the
"proof of a reasonable alternative design" formulation and addressing the
substance of their concerns in comments. Comments a and d to section 2
make clear that the foundational principle for design and marketing
liability is the unreasonable risk concept that underlies negligence,47 and
the last paragraph of comment n to section 2 explains that some negligent
marketing doctrines, such as negligent entrustment, fall outside the reach
of the Products Liability Restatement.48 Comment d to section 2
explicitly asserts that American courts have traditionally refused to
impose category liability on "products that are generally available and
widely... consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm. 49
products to be defective), affd sub. nom. Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 900
N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 2008).
45 Professor Harvey S.Perlman, a member of the A.L.I. Council and an advisor to our
project, was most vocal in urging that we adopt as the design standard the basic normative principle
underlying the concept of a reasonable alternative design.
46 Judge Robert E. Keeton (Advisor) and John P. Frank (Council Member) were the most
vocal proponents of this position.
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, d (1998) (both refer
explicitly to the negligence principle).
48 Cf id.§ 2 cmt. n (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
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To the consternation of many American Law Institute members
who supported our reasonable alternative design approach, we added
comment e to section 2, recognizing the possibility that courts in the
future might determine that certain categories of products, other than
those "generally available and widely . . . consumed" alluded to in

comment d, might be sufficiently dangerous and of such minimal social
utility that they would be deemed defective even if no safer alternative
design was available.5" Why did we include this comment that arguably
contradicts comment d's pronouncement against category liability? It
will be observed that comment d makes clear that section 2(b) of the
Restatement does not support category liability because American courts
have never embraced it;5 and comment e speaks merely of the possibility
that courts might encounter an unusual case in the future-it does not
endorse or recommend the imposition of category liability.52 But if we
were genuinely concerned with the possibility that the Restatement's
reliance on a risk-utility design standard might invite a movement toward
category liability, why did we endorse the inclusion of comment e? Quite
frankly, we were under significant pressure from critics, both interested
and disinterested, to recognize that limited category liability was at least
a logical implication of adopting a risk-utility approach to defective
design. Thus, we decided to "bear hug" that possibility and hopefully
disarm it by dealing with it forthrightly (and narrowly) in comment e.
Whether or not it was an error in judgment at the time, we simply
observe that our fears were unfounded-no court over the past ten years
has relied on comment e to adopt category liability. 3
III.

THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE "REACHING
CONSENSUS" ARTICLE

Having just published the Restatement with its "reasonable
alternative design" requirement for design defects and its rejection of
consumer expectations as a stand-alone test, why did we feel it was
necessary in 1998 to publish an article claiming that consensus had been
achieved? For one thing, it provided the opportunity to update the
research reflected in the Reporters' Note to section 2(b). We had finished
the Note at least two years prior to publication. Perhaps more
importantly, a law review article provided us the opportunity to explain
50

See id. § 2 cmt. e.

51

See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
The Reporters' Note to comment e makes this clear. See RESTATEMENT

52

(THIRD) OF

TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. e (1998).
53 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 162, 173 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J.,

dissenting) (citing comment e and arguing that category liability might apply to "Black Talon"
bullets, which were designed to expose razor sharp claws upon impact to create "hideous, gaping
wounds"); Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (court rejected the
application of comment e to declare a trampoline to be a manifestly unreasonable product).
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ourselves more openly, free from the understandable constraints we had
worked under as ALI Reporters. 4 Moreover, an article in a law review
with good circulation would help spread the word more quickly and
widely than would the publication of the new Restatement by itself,
however auspicious an event that may have been.
Because the instant Article undertakes a thorough, state-by-state
review of American law governing product design liability through early
2009, we would like briefly to critique the 1998 article. (Thus, even if we
identify shortcomings in the earlier effort, our research for this Article
will leave no doubt whatever as to where our courts stand on the relevant
issues.) In writing the instant Article, we have debated between us
whether "consensus" was the right word choice for the earlier piece.
Certainly we intended then (and intend now) to convey the message that
our courts overwhelmingly embrace a risk-utility/reasonable-alternativedesign approach to determining whether the plaintiff should reach the
jury with a claim of defective design. However, to the extent that our use
of the word "consensus" implied that the courts recognize this reality
self-consciously and rhetorically, we may have overstated our position.
Then and now, some of the courts that regularly and routinely require
plaintiffs to adduce plausible proof of a reasonable alternative design
insist that such proof is not always necessary and explain what they are
doing in terms of vindicating consumer expectations. Based on reported
decisions, plaintiffs rarely, if ever, reach the jury in a classic design case
without proof of a feasible alternative design;55 but a minority of courts
cling to the myth of strict design liability by clinging rhetorically to the
consumer expectations rubric. 6
The thoroughness of our research for the instant Article suggests
the other basis on which the 1998 article may have fallen a bit short.
Rather than undertake a state-by-state review of the relevant law, as we
do here, in our earlier article we chose representative examples with
which to reveal the then-current patterns of judicial and legislative
decisions. Our current research confirms that our previous assessments
were accurate. But in addition to being current, the research supporting
this Article is much broader and deeper. We turn now to examine the
case law that has developed since the publication of the Products
Liability Restatement in 1998.

54 Although Restatement reporters speak for themselves in their Notes-the comments
are official and speak for the Institute-we felt constrained to avoid the kind of argumentation that
the law review format allowed.
55 See infra notes 57-189 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 152-202 and accompanying text.
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DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE COURTS: A LOOK AT THE LAST
DECADE

In the ensuing sections we shall demonstrate the overwhelming
judicial support for the risk-utility/alternative design standard for classic
design defect cases. We shall begin by showcasing two states (Illinois
and Missouri) that say that they do not adopt the reasonable alternative
design standard and show that the rhetoric of these opinions belies the
reality that a reasonable alternative design is necessary to make out a
case in those jurisdictions. We shall then turn to the twenty-five states
whose opinions rather clearly indicate support for section 2(b) of the
Restatement. Finally, we shall examine the jurisprudence of other states
whose law on the standard for design defect is somewhat varied, but at
bottom requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in cases other
than those where an inference of defect can be made because the product
caused injury when put to its manifestly intended function.
A.

Consumer ExpectationsRhetoric andReality: The Illinois
Experience

If one were to choose a poster child for the proposition that
empty rhetoric continues to influence how courts articulate the standard
for design defect, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.57 would be it. Some brief history is in
order. In Lamkin v. Towner, decided in 1990, the Supreme Court of
Illinois adopted a two-pronged test for design defect." A plaintiff can
make out a case for defective design if the product either fails to meet
consumer expectations or does not meet risk-utility standards. 9 Since
Lamkin, in a series of decisions, the Illinois court has wavered back and
forth regarding the appropriate role of each test." Finally, in Mikolajczyk
the court sought to set the record straight. James Mikolajczyk, the driver
of a 1996 Ford Escort, suffered severe, irreversible brain trauma when
the defendant, a drunk driver, rear-ended his car at high speed.
57
58
59
60

No. 104983, 2008 WL4603565 (Ill. Oct. 17, 2008).
563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990).
Id. at 457.
See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 258-59 (111.2007) (court

concluded that utility lighter was not categorically exempt from risk-utility test merely because
product posed an obvious danger to children under a consumer expectations test; plaintiff therefore
had opportunity to prevail under the risk-utility test even if she failed the consumer expectations
test); Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1143-47 (I11.2005) (court discussed applicability
of section 2(b) to design defect claims based on negligence and strict liability); Hansen v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (I11.2002) (court affirmed judgment for plaintiff based on both
risk-utility test and consumer expectation test when an intravenous catheter that caused fatal air
embolism could have been designed more safely at low cost and had been marketed as safety device
and did not present obvious danger). For discussion of the pre-Mikolajczyk debate over design defect
tests in Illinois, see Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow:
Negligence andStrict Liability in DesignDefect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7 (2006).
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Mikolajczyk's widow brought an action in strict liability against Ford
Motor Co. and Mazda Motor Corp., claiming that the driver's seat was
defectively designed in that it propelled her husband rearward, causing
him to hit his head on the backseat.6'
Defendants introduced evidence that the seat in the Ford Escort
met risk-utility standards and provided greater overall safety than an
alternative design.62 Plaintiff insisted that the jury be allowed to conclude
that the seat design was defective if it failed to meet consumer
expectations.63 Defendants urged the court to adopt section 2(b) of the
Products Liability Restatement.' The court denied defendants' request
on the ground that doing so would require a plaintiff "to plead and prove
the existence of a feasible alternative design in every case."65 Then, in an
interesting turnaround, the court said:
Although we have declined to adopt section 2 of the Products Liability
Restatement as a statement of substantive law, we do find its formulation of the
risk-utility test to be instructive. Under section 2(b) the risk-utility balance is to
be determined based on consideration of a "broad range of factors," including .
. .the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the product,
including expectations arisingfromproductportrayaland marketing ....
We adopt this formulation of the risk-utility test and hold that when the
evidence presented by either or both parties supports the application of this
integrated test, an appropriate instruction is to be given at the request of either
party. If however, both parties' theories of the case are framed entirely in
terms of consumer expectations, including those based on advertising and
marketing messages, and/or whether the product was being put to a reasonably
foreseeable use at the time of the injury, the jury should be instructedonly on
the consumer-expectation test.
Adoption of this integrated test resolves the question of whether the answer to
the risk-utility test "trumps" the answer to the consumer-expectation test

61
62

Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *1.
Id. at *26. The court offered the following summary of defendants' argument that the

seat was safe:
[D]efendants claim the evidence showed that the designers of the CT20 seat had to take
into account all of the various types of possible collisions (front-end, rear-end, side,
rollover) that could occur at a wide range of speeds, and with occupants of different sizes,

who may or may not be properly using their seatbelts, positioned at various seats in the
vehicle ....If the court had given the tendered nonpattem risk-utility instruction instead
of the pattern instruction, defendants posit, the jury would have been directed to weigh
this evidence, including expert testimony that the yielding seat that caused James's death
might nevertheless have been a safer alternative for other drivers in other types of
collisions. Defendants also point to testimony by one of their own experts that the
yielding driver's seat may have prevented fatal or more serious injury to the backseat
passenger even while causing more serious injury to James.

Id.
64

Id.
Id. at

65

Id. at *15.

63

*14 ("The rule advocated by defendants is contained in section 2(b) of the
Products Liability Restatement . .
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into the former and is but one factor among
because the latter is incorporated
66
many for the jury to consider.

Rhetoric aside, what is the bottom line of Mikolajczyk? From a
functional standpoint, it would appear that the consumer expectations test
is a dead letter in Illinois. In any case in which a plaintiff seeks to
proceed solely under the consumer expectations test, a defendant need
only counter with risk-utility evidence to cause the court to apply the
factors set forth in section 2, comment f Under that test, consumer
expectations are but one factor among other risk-utility factors to be
considered in deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
Conversely, when a defendant defends on the ground that a product
meets consumer expectations, perhaps because the risks are obvious, a
plaintiff need only introduce risk-utility evidence for the court to apply
risk-utility balancing. The only cases in which risk-utility balancing will
not come into play are those in which a product fails to perform its
manifestly intended function and in which defective design can be
inferred from the fact of injury. There can be no rational risk-utility
defense to a product that simply cannot do what it was designed to do. If
the steering mechanism of a car fails when it is driven out of the
dealership, one cannot say it was reasonably designed to fail in this
manner. That contingency is, however, covered by section 3 of the
Restatement, which allows a court to apply a res ipsa-like inference of
defect when defect can easily be inferred from the mere occurrence of
the accident.67
Two matters deserve comment. First, even if consumer
expectations cannot serve as the sole test for defect, they are certainly
relevant to risk-utility balancing. Thus, how a product is perceived by
consumers implicates how the product will be used and ultimately affects
the probability that the product may cause harm. The Learned Hand riskutility formula takes into account both the probability and gravity of the
harm and weighs both of these factors against the burden of taking
precaution against the harm. As the Illinois court correctly observes,
reasonable consumer expectations are one factor among many in
deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.6" Second, a
product that fails reasonable consumer expectations may still meet riskutility norms. Indeed, with regard to the Ford Escort, the court noted that
a consumer might reasonably expect that the driver's seat would not
collapse upon impact and cause serious injury.69 Nonetheless, it may be
that the seat utilized by Ford is the one that provides the greatest overall
66 Id. at *22 (internal citations omitted and second emphasis added).
67

68

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *22.

§ 3 (1998).

69 Id. at *23 ("Rear-end collisions are reasonably foreseeable and the ordinary consumer

would likely expect that a seat would not collapse rearward in such an accident, allowing the
occupant to sustain massive head injury.").
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safety and that an alternative design that would have saved the plaintiff
from injury in the rare case of a high-speed, rear-end collision would
present greater dangers to occupants of the Ford Escort in collisions of
lesser intensity that occur with much greater frequency.7 ° It was for that
reason that the court insisted that the Mikolajczyk case be retried and that
the jury be given a risk-utility instruction in which consumer
expectations are taken into consideration as a relevant, but not a
controlling, factor.7 1
Now to the big question. Why did the Illinois court not adopt
section 2(b) as the standard for design defect, utilizing the factors set
forth in comment f in deciding whether the manufacturer should have
adopted a reasonable alternative design? One answer might be that,
desiring to retain the consumer expectations test in cases where riskutility evidence is not forthcoming from either side, the court felt
constrained to reject section 2(b), which it said insists that a plaintiff
present evidence of a reasonable alternative design as a sina qua non in
every design defect case. As a practical matter in cases where risk-utility
evidence is presented by either party, the factors set forth in comment f
are all relevant to whether an alternative design is reasonable and should
have been adopted. Thus, the court's rejection of section 2(b) has little
meaning.
A second answer might be that the court was scared off by
plaintiffs argument that requiring a reasonable alternative design was a
new invention foisted onto plaintiffs by the Reporters of the Products
Liability Restatement and was somehow harsher than risk-utility
balancing. 72 This view has been voiced by other courts.73 It is dead
wrong. In any risk-utility balancing the answer depends on whether there
was a safer alternative available that would have been preferable. Those
courts that profess to do risk-utility balancing and yet take the position
that the availability of a reasonable alternative design is only one
relevant factor in risk-utility balancing fail to understand the basics of
risk-utility analysis. Under risk-utility balancing in products litigation, a
product may be found to be unreasonably dangerous in only two ways:
(1) the product should have been more safely designed; or (2) the product

See supra note 62.
Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *29 ("Although defendants were not prevented
from introducing evidence regarding the risks and benefits of the alternative designs that were
feasible at the time, and were not prevented from arguing to the jury that, on balance, the CT20 seat
was not 'unreasonably dangerous' because it prevented more injuries than it caused, the jury was
specifically instructed to focus its deliberations solely on whether the seat was unsafe when put to a
reasonably foreseeable use. The lack of a risk-utility instruction... prejudiced defendants' ability to
obtain a full, fair, and comprehensive review of the issues by the jury.").
72 Id. at * 14-15.
73 See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001)
("[W]e are . . . troubled by the fact that 2(b) sets the bar higher for recovery in strict products
liability design defect cases than in comparable negligence cases.").
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category should not have been marketed at all.74 The first conclusion
depends on whether a reasonable alternative design was available. The
second conclusion clearly implicates product category liability.75 Earlier
we established that American courts have almost universally rejected
category liability.76 Thus, if a court is employing risk-utility balancing, it
can only be asking whether a reasonable alternative design should have
been adopted.
In any event, under the analysis in Mikolajczyk the reality is that,
if risk-utility evidence is introduced by either side, the judge will give the
case to the jury with a risk-utility instruction patterned after comment f.
The defendant will argue that it correctly chose a cost-effective,
reasonably safe design, and the plaintiff will insist that a reasonable
alternative was available that could have avoided or reduced the injury.
Any plaintiff who shows up in court knowing full well that the defendant
will introduce risk-utility evidence that supports the product design must
be ready to counter with evidence that a reasonable alternative was
available. The burden of proof on risk-utility, according to the Illinois
court, lies with the plaintiff.77 Reasonable alternative design is not an idea
conjured up by the Restatement drafters. It lies at the very heart of riskutility balancing.78
B.

Liability Without Rhetoric: The Missouri Experience

Missouri is an interesting example of a state that, while
disavowing reliance on the Products Liability Restatement, nevertheless
requires plaintiffs to establish a reasonable alternative design in order to
make out a prima facie case of design defect. In a series of cases, the
Supreme Court of Missouri has specifically rejected the consumer
expectations test,79 risk-utility balancing,"0 and the Restatement test
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design.8' Instead, a jury is to
be instructed only that liability for defective product design depends on a
finding that the product is unreasonably dangerous. 2 Yet, both state and
federal court decisions in Missouri uphold jury verdicts whenever the

74

See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supranote 9, § 8.5.

75
76
77
78
79

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1142-43 (111.2005).
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, §§ 8.4-8.5.
Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc. 707 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (rejecting consumer expectations test for jury instructions).
80 Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 152-54 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (rejecting
risk-utility balancing for jury instructions).
81 Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 64-65 (Mo. 1999) (en banc)
(rejecting reasonable alternative design in favor of "unreasonably dangerous" instruction).
82 Id. at 65.
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plaintiff proves a reasonable alternative design, 3 reverse summary
judgments in favor of defendants whenever plaintiffs proffer credible
evidence of a reasonable alternative design,84 and grant summary
judgment for defendants whenever plaintiffs fail to produce credible
evidence of a reasonable alternative design."
Often the grant of summary judgment in Missouri is predicated
on the failure of plaintiffs expert to meet Daubert criteria. 6 This is odd
on the face of it-if it is not necessary to prove a reasonable alternative
design, why should an expert's opinion on the feasibility of an alternative
design be necessary? If a plaintiff can establish a case merely by
asserting that the product is unreasonably dangerous, why should a jury
not be permitted to decide that issue sans expert testimony on the
83

Bass v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842, 844-45, 851 (8th Cir. 1998) (court affirmed

jury verdict in favor of plaintiff who claimed that his head hit the car window during a collision
because the seat belt mechanism was defectively designed in that it allowed too much slack to
develop; a design that would have created more tension between the belt and the body of the plaintiff
would have averted plaintiff's head injuries); Peters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 200 S.W.3d 1, 17-20
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (jury verdict in favor of plaintiff claiming design defect in the cruise-control
mechanism of a 1993 Oldsmobile that caused the car to go out of control upheld; plaintiff introduced
sufficient expert testimony of alternative design of the cruise-control mechanism that would have
avoided the accident); Redfield v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 42 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2001) (court upheld jury verdict in favor of plaintiff's decedent against the manufacturer of
a ventilator that failed causing death to plaintiff; plaintiff introduced evidence that the ventilator was
unreasonably dangerous because it did not have a redundant backup breathing system).
Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2008) (court reversed summary
judgment for defendant on claims of plaintiff truck drivers that the ratchet system used to tie down
new automobiles on transport trailers was defective and caused them serious injuries; though under
both Missouri and Kansas law [whose laws applied to the respective plaintiffs] plaintiff is not
required to prove a reasonable alternative design, the plaintiffs' expert opinion set forth several
practical alternative designs for ratchet mechanisms that were safer and would have avoided the
plaintiffs' injuries); Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc., 512 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 2007) (after noting that
Missouri does not require testimony of a reasonable alternative design, the court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on claim that a "scissors lift" should have been
designed with greater stability so that it would not tip over when the rear wheels dropped off a
concrete floor into the hold; plaintiffs case met Daubertstandards because there was evidence that
at the time the product was manufactured the technology existed to produce a more stable lift that
would have avoided the plaintiffs death); Anderson v. F.J. Little Mach. Co., 68 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir.
1995) (court reversed trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff
suffered injuries when his hand was caught while trying to wipe the rollers clean when a metal
straightening machine was running because plaintiffs expert had testified in a deposition that the
machine could have been equipped with an interlock barrier guard which would have prevented the
unsafe cleaning of the rollers of the machine while it was in operation).
85 Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999) (court upheld grant
of
summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that the plaintiffs expert's suggested alternative
design of an "awareness barrier" to the corn head of a combine did not meet Daubert reliability
criteria; plaintiff was injured when he got swept into the combine by feeding the combine from the
front though he was warned never to do so); Shaffer v. Amada Am. Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.
Mo. 2003) (defendant granted summary judgment against plaintiffs claim that a press brake
machine was defectively designed causing plaintiff to lose multiple fingers when his hand got caught
between the lower ram of the machine and the upper die; plaintiffs expert's proffered alternative
design did not meet Daubert criteria and was inadmissible); Pillow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 184
F.R.D. 304 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (defendant granted summary judgment against plaintiff's design defect
claim that GM van, on impact with another vehicle, transmitted forces to the braking system, causing
the brake pedal to violently thrust rearward; plaintiffs expert's alternative design failed to meet
Daubertcriteria and was inadmissible).
86 See supra note 85.
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feasibility of the proposed alternative design? Where the jurisprudence of
a state seeks to escape the conundrum of any theoretical structure, yet the
cases are replete with discussions of a reasonable alternative design as
the criterion for the validity of the cause of action, the lesson is clear.
Courts, with or without a theoretical structure for defective design, focus
on reasonable alternative design as the crucial element in deciding the
bona fides of a design defect case.87
C.

ReasonableAlternativeDesign Is the Strong Majority Rulefor
ClassicDesign Defect Cases

Having staked out the position that, notwithstanding confusing
rhetoric, plaintiffs do not reach juries in classic design defect cases
without offering evidence of a reasonable alternative design, we now
turn our attention to those states that have clearly adopted the view that a
reasonable alternative design is necessary to establish a prima facie case
of design defect. Given how deeply entrenched section 402A is in the
case law, we are gratified to see the large number of courts that have said
that plaintiff must present proof of a reasonable or feasible alternative
design. Some have done so by legislative mandate, but the large majority
has done so by judicial decision. Some critics have sought to
delegitimize statutory provisions that require proof of a reasonable
alternative design as nothing more than reactionary "tort reform"
accomplished at the bidding of business interests.88 However, when
legislation is balanced, backed by the overwhelming body of American
scholars 9 and part of a growing body of case law that is supportive,
pejorative name-calling rings hollow. Thus, the five states that by statute

87 Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1063, 1066 (plaintiff was not required to prove a reasonable
alternative design though Court reversed summary judgment for defendant on grounds that there
were several practical and safer alternative designs for ratchet mechanism); Skyjack, 512 F.3d at 443,
446-48 (plaintiff's testimony of a reasonable alternative design was not required though Court
reversed summary judgment for defendant on grounds that there was a reasonable alternative design
available for "scissors lift"). In two Missouri Appellate Court decisions, the courts did not require
the plaintiffs to prove a reasonable alternative design but gave heavy credence to the availability of a
reasonable alternative design. See Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (court upheld jury verdict for plaintiff on grounds that Kool Menthol cigarettes
were unreasonably dangerous; plaintiff was not required to prove a reasonable alternative design
though the court concluded that evidence demonstrated that specific design choices by defendant had
the potential to affect plaintiff's health during the time period she smoked); Thompson v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 207 S.W.3d 76, 95-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (court found that plaintiff
did not have to prove a reasonable alternative design and held that the evidence went beyond a
categorical attack on cigarettes; there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
products were unreasonably dangerous as designed since plaintiff had submitted proof that tobacco
companies made specific design choices that had the potential to affect plaintiff's health during the
time period he smoked).
88 See, e.g., Larry S. Stewart, Reaffirning Strict Liability for Product Design Cases,
TRIAL MAG., Nov. 2008, at 11 n.15. This theme has been repeated on numerous occasions at
symposia and seminars.
89 See supranote 33.
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require proof of a reasonable alternative design-Louisiana,"
Mississippi,9 New Jersey,92 North Carolina,93 and Texas 94 -represent
one-fifth of the twenty five states that we count in support of the
ProductsLiability Restatement's position.
We shall not burden the reader with a state-by-state discussion of
the decisions in the twenty jurisdictions whose common law decisions
support the proposition that a reasonable alternative design is necessary
in a classic design defect case. The notes in the margin will have to bear
the weight of accomplishing that task. We note the following
jurisdictions that support the thesis: Alabama,95 Delaware,96 District of

90 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.56 (West 1998) (The statute provides that "[a] product is
unreasonably dangerous if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control: (1) There existed
an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's damage."). Under
Louisiana's statute, failure to make out the statutory elements will result in a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant. Id.; see, e.g., Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586, 590 (5th
Cir. 1994) (plaintiff was injured when an allegedly defective pump leaked water causing her to slip
and fall; summary judgment granted because plaintiffs experts did not testify that an alternative
design existed when the product left the defendant's control and did not testify as to the effect of the
suggested alternative design on the utility of the pump).
91 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63(a), (f) (2008). To make out a prima facie case for design
defect, a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design was available. Failure to proffer a
credible reasonable alternative design will result in summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549-50, 552 (N.D. Miss. 2005),
aft'd, 193 Fed. App'x. 349 (5th Cir. 2006) (claimant asserted that a stepladder suffered from design
defect that caused the claimant's accident, resulting in injury; court granted summary judgment to
defendant when plaintiff "offered no evidence relative to the effectiveness of the alternative design
in reducing the severity or frequency of accidents"); Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 866 So. 2d 456, 461
(Miss. 2004) (plaintiff hit in the eye in a paintball game alleged defective design against the paintball
gun manufacturer; summary judgment granted to defendant when plaintiff did not introduce
evidence of feasible alternative design).
92 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (West 2000); see, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d
518, 521 (N.J. 2000) (court compared New Jersey statute, which puts the burden on the defendant to
prove there was a lack of feasible alternative design for a defense, and section 2(b) of Products
Liability Restatement, which puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff). The Cavanaugh court
concluded that "[t]he plaintiff, under New Jersey law, is usually required to show the existence of a
reasonable alternative design. But where the defendant shows that there exists no design alternative
which was practical and technically feasible, the jury need not weigh the plaintiffs proposed design
against the defendant's." ld
93 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-6 (West 2000); see, e.g., Dewitt v. Eveready Battery
Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 518-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002) (court upheld
summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff proffered an alternative design to batteries that had
leaked onto his skin and caused alkaline bums, when the court did not find that the alternative design
was practical, safer, or likely to have prevented the harm to the plaintiff).
94 TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (Vernon 2005). Texas courts have
demanded that evidence of a proffered safer alternative be backed by expert testimony that evaluates
the economic feasibility of the alternative design and the correlative risks that the alternative design
presents to the user. See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 518-20 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying Texas law) (court reversed jury verdict for plaintiff because plaintiffs expert never
evaluated the risks of the proposed alternative design); Smith v. Aqua-Flo, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 473, 478
(Tex. App. 2000) (plaintiff must establish not only technical feasibility but also economic feasibility
of a safer alternative design; court upheld directed verdict in favor of manufacturer).
95 Alabama unequivocally requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in design
defect cases. Summary judgment has been granted for defendant in numerous cases where this
requirement is not met. The leading case is GeneralMotors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala.
1985), stating that:
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In order to prove defectiveness, the plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical, alternative
design was available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured the automobile. The
existence of a safer, practical, alternative design must be proved by showing that: (a) The
plaintiff's injuries would have been eliminated or in some way reduced by use of the
alternative design, and that; (b) taking into consideration such factors as the intended use
of the vehicle, its styling, cost, and desirability, its safety aspects, the foreseeability of the
particular accident, the likelihood of injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury if
that accident occurred, the obviousness of the defect, and the manufacturer's ability to
eliminate the defect, the utility of the alternative design outweighed the utility of the
design actually used.
Id. at 1191. This rule has been consistently applied in the Alabama courts. See Townsend v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 423 (Ala. 1994) (summary judgment granted for defendants as
plaintiff's expert testimony did not establish viability of an alternative design of a compaction unit
on a garbage truck); Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 1991) (In
answering a question certified by the United States District Court, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that failure to prove that a "safer, practical, alternative design was available" was a bar to a cause of
action for defective design under both the Alabama Extended Manufacturer Liability Doctrine
(AEMLD) and negligence.). Cases decided after the adoption of the ProductsLiability Restatement
continue to require proof of a reasonable alternative design to make out a prima facie case under
AEMLD. See, e.g., Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25, 27-28 (Ala. 1998) ("APJI
[Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions] requires a jury to determine, using a risk/utility balancing
process, whether a plaintiff alleging a lack of crashworthiness has shown that a safer, practical
alternative design existed that would have eliminated or reduced the plaintiff's injuries if it had been
used.").
96 Allen v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. Civ.A. 94-264 JJF, 1997 WL 34501372, at *1
(D. Del. Dec. 18, 1997). In granting summary judgment for defendant-manufacturer of computer
keyboards when there was no evidence that the plaintiffs proffered alternative design of a computer
keyboard would prevent or lessen carpal tunnel syndrome, the Court concluded that "a product is
defective in design where it is not reasonably fit for its intended purpose and where the design has
created a risk of harm which is so probable that an ordinary prudent person, acting as the product's
manufacturer, would pursue a different available design to substantially lessen the probability of
harm." Id. at *45 (emphasis added); Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974) ("[T]he proper test is whether the design has created a risk of harm which is so
probable that an ordinarily prudent person, acting as a manufacturer, would pursue a different
availabledesign which would substantially lessen the probability of harm.") (emphasis added).
97 In Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272 (D.C. 1995), the court
stated that to establish design defect, "[i]n general, the plaintiff must 'show the risks, costs and
benefits of the product in question and alternative designs[,'] and 'that the magnitude of the danger
from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding the danger."' Id. at 1276 (citing Hull v. Eaton
Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); accord Artis v. Corona Corp. of Japan, 703 A.2d
1214, 1215 (D.C.1997).
98 In Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994), the court adopted
risk-utility
balancing as the governing test for design litigation, stating:
[Tihe reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs and
adopting the safest one if it is feasible is considered the "heart" of design defect cases,
since it is only at their most extreme that design defect cases reflect the position that a
product is simply so dangerous that it should not have been made available at all.
Id.(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The position adopted by the Georgia high court recognizes
that, except for the "most extreme" instance, when a court determines that the product is so
dangerous that it should not have been sold at all, it is necessary to prove a reasonable alternative
design. See id. This position is supported by section 2(b) and comment e thereto. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) & cmt. e (1998).
99 Although section 34-20-4-1 of the Indiana Code adopts the consumer expectation test,
the Code specifically provides that, for liability to attach in cases where there is an alleged design
defect or failure to warn, "the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller
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failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing
the warnings or instructions." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-2 (LexisNexis 2008). Even prior to 1998,
when the express requirement that negligence is the governing rule in design defect and failure to
wam cases took effect, Indiana case law required proof of a reasonable alternative design to make
out a case for defective design. See, e.g., Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) (court held that a "burden of proof scheme" required that "plaintiff must prove that a feasible
safer alternative product design existed"); see also Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200,
1206 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Indiana law) (Although Indiana statute sets forth a consumer
expectation test, "[t]o allege that a manufacturer breached its duty to design a safe product under
strict liability, a claimant must offer a safer, more practicable product design than the design in
question. Accordingly, since [plaintiff] failed to present evidence that the product was flawed in its
design and he failed to illustrate that a better design was cost-effective, summary judgment was
properly issued as to the claim of design defect.") (citation omitted); Pries v. Honda Motor Co., 31
F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law) (in crashworthiness case where issue was
safety of automobile design, court cited to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2(b) & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994) and said "[tJo demonstrate a defect, the plaintiff must
compare the costs and benefits of alternative designs"); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42
(Ind. 1990) (applying risk-utility analysis); Rogers v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045,
1051 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), affid in part and vacated in part, 745 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2001) ("A
defective design is one which makes the product inadequate or unsafe relative to alternate design
choices.").
100 See, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169, 181-82 (Iowa 2002)
(Court adopted sections 1 and 2 of the Products Liability Restatement; Restatement design standards
under section 2(b) apply whether the claim is brought under negligence, strict liability or the implied
warranty of merchantability).
101 In Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky
Supreme Court reviewed a set of early design defect cases, such as Jones v. Hutchinson
Manufacturing,Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973), and Ingersoll-RandCompany v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d
924 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). The court, citing to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
2 cmt. d (1998), said Kentucky law "stands for the proposition that design defect liability requires
proof of a feasible alternative design." Toyota Motor Corp., 136 S.W.3d at 42. Applying that
principle to the case at bar, the court said:
[t]he elements of aprimafaciecrashworthiness claim are: (1) an alternative safer design,
practical under the circumstances; (2) proof of what injuries, if any, would have resulted
had the alternative, safer design been used; and (3) some method of establishing the
extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design.
ld at 41; see also Burke v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (W.D. Ky. 2007) ("In the
typical design defect claim Kentucky law requires proof of a feasible alternative design."
Defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. denied because plaintiffs "met the requirement of showing a
feasible alternative."); Fritz v. Campell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., No. 05-360-JBC, 2007 WL
1558509, at *1, *3-4 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007), affd, 279 Fed. App'x. 333 (6th Cir. 2008) (summary
judgment granted to manufacturer of pressure washer; the design alternatives introduced by plaintiff
supported the technological feasibility of the alternative design but did not address many factors
necessary to determine the issue of whether the product that caused the injury was unreasonably
dangerous); Estate of Bigham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 766, 779 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(summary judgment granted to defendant in crashworthiness case because of plaintiff's failure to
establish a reasonable alternative design); Caudill v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. Civ.A. 04-333-DLB,
2005 WL 3149311, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2005) (summary judgment granted to defendant in
crashworthiness case; plaintiff failed to introduce "competent evidence[] that a feasible, alternative,
safer desi n existed").
1u2 See St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988) (court rejected
consumer expectations test and adopted risk-utility balancing as the standard for determining
defective design). The St. Germain court concluded, "In actions based upon defects in design,
negligence and strict liability theories overlap in that under both theories the plaintiff must prove that
the product was defectively designed thereby exposing the user to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Such proof will involve an examination of the utility of its design, the risk of the design and the
feasibility of safer alternatives." Id. (quoting Stanley v. Schiari Mobile Homes, 462 A.2d 1144, 1148
(Me. 1983)). At least one federal court has held that Maine requires proof of a reasonable alternative
design. See Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80-81 (D. Me. 2000) ("[l]n
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Maine, a plaintiff in a design defect case must prove that an alternative design is feasible and
safer."). In Reali, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that a safer alternative automobile seat exists
and court granted summary judgment to defendant. See id.But see Phillips v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
No. 02-179-PC, 2003 WL 21011349, at *3 (D. Me. May 5, 2003), affd, No. Civ. 02-179-P-C, 2003
WL 21276388 (D. Me. May 29, 2003) (proof of reasonable alternative design to make out a prima
facie case was reasonable interpretation of Maine case law but not necessarily mandatory).
103 In an early case based on a negligence theory, Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d
1188 (Mass. 1978), the court held that there is "a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show an
available design modification which would reduce the risk without undue cost or interference with
the performance of the machinery." Id.at 1193. In a case decided the same year, Back v. Wickes
Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978), the court held that Massachusetts law of warranty was
"congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A (1965)," id.at 969, and went on to hold that in a design case it would put heavy emphasis on
the "mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design,
and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design." Id.at 970 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)). Some
twelve years later in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505
U.S. 1215 (1992), on the issue of federal preemption in the field of cigarette labeling, the court
discussed requirements of proof in a design defect case and said,
[w]e are aware of no Massachusetts case in which liability attached in the absence of
evidence that some different, arguably safer, alternative design was possible. In a design
defect case premised on negligence, the existence of a safer alternative design is a sine
qua non for the imposition of liability.... It follows, we think, that a design defect case
premised on breach of warranty is, in Massachusetts, similarly dependent on proof of the
existence of a safer alternative design-a design which reasonably could, or should, have
been adopted.
Id.at 1225 (citations omitted). A similar view is expressed in Johnson v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D. Mass 2000) (applying Massachusetts law) ("In the
tobacco context, as with design defect cases premised on negligence, a plaintiff alleging breach of
warranty based on design defect must first plead that the tobacco in the cigarettes consumed was
itself defective, and then offer proof of a safer alternative design which could reasonably have been
adopted.") (citation omitted); see also O'Neil v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 06-10433-DPW,
2008 WL 2066948, at *7 (D. Mass. May 14, 2008) (breach of implied warranty claim against
lawnmower manufacturer survived motion for summary judgment because plaintiff introduced
credible evidence of safer alternative design that would have prevented the injury); Alves v. Mazda
Motor of Am., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 285, 298-99 (D. Mass. 2006) (applying Massachusetts law)
(claim that defectively designed airbag caused plaintiff's blindness dismissed on summary
judgment). In Alves, the court found that the plaintiffs experts did not meet Daubert criteria but
explained that even if the expert testimony had been admissible, claims of implied warranty and
negligence would be dismissed since the experts offered "no evidence on the mechanical feasibility
of any alternative design, the costs of such a design or the consequences of such a design."
Id.at 299.
104 Michigan has explicitly rejected the consumer expectations test as the general standard
for defective design and has adopted a pure risk-utility analysis for design defect cases, regardless of
whether the case was based on strict liability (or implied warranty of merchantability) or negligence.
See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984). As a practical matter, the plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case of design defect without producing evidence of a reasonable
alternative design. In Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982), the failure of
the plaintiff to produce evidence of the practicality and cost-effectiveness of a proffered alternative
design was grounds for upholding a directed verdict for the defendant. Id. at 378-79; accord Scott v.
Allen Bradley Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) ("Owens established that the
plaintiff must present evidence concerning the magnitude of the risks involved and the
reasonableness of any proposed alternative design."). The Michigan Court of Appeals in Reeves v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), summarized the elements of a prima facie
case of failure to provide adequate safety devices:
[A] prima facie case of a design defect premised upon the omission of a safety device
requires first a showing of the magnitude of foreseeable risks, including the likelihood of
occurrence of the type of accident precipitating the need for the safety device and the
severity of the injuries sustainable from such an accident. It secondly requires a showing
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of alternative safety devices and whether those devices would have been effective as a
reasonable means of minimizing the foreseeable risk of danger. This latter showing may
entail an evaluation of the alternative design in terms of its additional utility as a safety
measure and its trade-offs against the costs and effective use of the product.
Id. at 329 (emphasis added); see also Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 762 F.2d 46, 47-48
(6th Cir. 1985) (applying Michigan law); Foster v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 714 F.2d 654, 657 (6th
Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan law); Gawenda v. Werner Co., 932 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (applying Michigan law), aft'd, 127 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 837
F. Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying Michigan law), aff'd, 998 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1993).
More recent cases continue to articulate the requirement that to make out a prima facie case of
design defect, plaintiff must present evidence of reasonable alternative design. See, e.g., Witbeck v.
Checkmate Boats, Inc., No. 275934, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1473, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17,
2008); Strauch v. Raymond Corp., No. 254224, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3297, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 2005); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carrier Corp., No. 235567, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS
456, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003); Cacevic v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 645 N.W.2d. 287, 293
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Bazinau v. Mackinac Island Carriage Tours, 593 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999).
105 In Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing,Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212-13 (Minn. 1982),
the
Minnesota court rejected the consumer expectations test and adopted risk-utility balancing as the
governing rule for design defect litigation. Minnesota recognizes that, in general, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing a reasonable, safer alternative design, but notes that there may be rare cases in
which that requirement does not apply. Thus, in Kallio v. FordMotor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn.
1987), the court stated that, in establishing that a product was unreasonably dangerous, "a factor
bearing upon the . . . requirement will be the existence or nonexistence of a feasible alternative
design.... [T]he plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of showing the existence of an alternative design
that was safer." Id. at 96 (emphasis added). Amplifying this point in a lengthy footnote, the court
said,
Examination of our cases ... alleg[ing] defective design demonstrates that, as a practical
matter, successful plaintiffs, almost without fail, introduce evidence of an alternative
safer design. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, (Minn. 1984) (plaintiff
presented evidence of manufacturer's actual alternative design of dockboard); Hudson v.
Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff presented evidence that a
portion of the release mechanism of a hydraulic bed dumptruck was superfluously long
creating the defect); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977)
(plaintiff presented evidence that a turn signal's use of a plastic yoke inside a lock
steering column required a design allowing a greater clearance radius than the
manufacturer's design had allowed); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967) (plaintiff presented evidence that the cover of a vaporizer
should have been secured such that it would prevent water in the vaporizer's jar from
simultaneously discharging if the vaporizer should tip over).
Id. at 96 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
The Minnesota high court in Kallio did not require that in all cases a reasonable
alternative design be presented to the jury as an essential element in finding a defect. The court said
that "[a]lthough normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented initially by the
plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases." Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added). The court
exemplified this exception by citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978),
stating that "[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably
dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned." Kallio, 407
N.W.2d at 97 n.8.
A fair reading of Minnesota law is that for the majority of design defect cases, proof of
a reasonable alternative is necessary. It is not, however, necessary to instruct a jury on a reasonable
alternative design requirement, though a general instruction on risk-utility is required by the court. In
rare cases, when a product involves negligible utility and high risk, the reasonable alternative design
requirement is not imposed. The position of the Minnesota courts is thus fully consistent with both
the black letter of section 2 and comments d, e, and f. A leading authority on Minnesota products
liability law agrees. See generally Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products
LiabilityLaw and the Restatement (Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. I
(1998).
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Cases decided post-adoption of the Products Liability Restatement are in accord. See,
e.g., Wagner v. Hesston Corp., 450 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law) (court
noted that to satisfy the requirement that a product be unreasonably dangerous, "the plaintiff
ordinarily has the burden of showing the existence of an alternative design that was safer" (quoting
Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 96)). The court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment because
plaintiff's suggested alternative design did not meet Daubert standards. See id. at 761; Young v.
Pollock Eng'g Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law). "Only in
rare cases do defective-design claims succeed without showing a safer design. 'Conceivably, rare
cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be
removed from the market rather than be redesigned."' Young, 428 F.3d at 791 (citation omitted). The
Young court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant because there was
ample evidence of a reasonable alternative design. Id. at 791; see also Solo v. Trus Joist MacMillan,
No. Civ. 02-2955 (RHKIRLE), 2004 WL 524898, at *11-12 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2004) (plaintiff
failed to provide evidence of a feasible alternative safer design for a furnace as required by
Minnesota law; defendant entitled to summary judgment); Bruzer v. Danek Med., Inc., No. Civ. 395-971/RHKJMM, 1999 WL 613329, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 1999) (applying Minnesota law)
(defendant entitled to summary judgment on claim that medical device was defectively designed
because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of reasonable alternative design and product was not one
of rare cases where product should not have been marketed at all).
106 Montana courts have few decisions dealing with the issue of the standard for design
defect. However, the few cases extant support the proposition that to maintain a claim of design
defect a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted that would
have reduced the harm. In Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195 (Mont. 1986), the court said
that "a design is defective if at the time of manufacture an alternative designed product would have
been safer than the original designed product and was both technologically feasible and a marketable
reality." Id. at 202. Earlier in the decision, the court emphasized that this rule applied when "a
manufactured product is claimed to be unreasonably dangerous because a safer alternative was
available to the manufacturer." Id. The court left open the question of how it would rule if no
alternative design was technologically feasible. Id. at 201 (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d
298, 306 (N.J. 1983), superseded in part by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (West 2000), as
recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990), in which the court
held that a design could be found to be defective even if no feasible alternative was available). Even
if the Montana court were to follow O'Brien, in the ordinary design defect case, a reasonable
alternative design would have to be proven; O'Brien, on its own terms, allows for dispensing with
the alternative design requirement only when the product has minimal social utility. See id. (Some
products "are so dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer
would bear the cost of liability of harm to others."); see also Preston v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial
Dist. Court, 936 P.2d 814, 820 (Mont. 1997) ("[Elvidence of alternative designs available prior to
the manufacture of the N12 [model pneumatic roofing nailer] is not only relevant, but necessary, to
[plaintiffs] products liability claim and, therefore, the District Court is clearly proceeding under a
mistake of law in precluding discovery of alternative design evidence .... "); Krueger v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 783 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Mont. 1989) (court reiterated the need for a reasonable
alternative design).
107 The leading case in New Mexico is Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M.
1995). Brooks attributes time-of-trial knowledge to defendant, but, given that knowledge, applies a
risk-utility test to the issue of design defect. In Brooks, the New Mexico high court stated that it
would charge a manufacturer with time-of-trial knowledge of risk regardless of whether it was
available to defendant at time of sale. Nonetheless, the court clearly adopted a risk-utility analysis as
the grounds for deciding whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 61-62. It should be
noted that the court said:
Under the current product liability jury instructions, SCRA 1986, 13-1401 to 131433 (Repl.Pamp.199 1), the jury is instructed that a supplier's liability is measured by
"an unreasonable risk of injury resulting from a condition of the product or from a
manner of its use." UJI 13-1406. As to either flaw or design, the jury is informed that
"[a]n unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent person having full
knowledge of the risk would find unacceptable." UJI 13-1407. Lastly, the jury is
instructed specifically that in determining whether a product design poses an
unreasonable risk of injury, "[y]ou should consider the ability to eliminate the risk
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive."
Id. By requiring the jury to make a risk-benefit calculation, these instructions adequately
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define "defect" so as to focus jury attention on evidence reflecting meritorious choices
made by the manufacturer on alternative design and so as to minimize the risk that the
public will be deprived needlessly of beneficial products for the sake of compensating
injured victims.

• . . As observed above, our existing uniform jury instructions allow proof and
argument on all of the factors suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Torts as relevant
in determining whether the omission of a reasonable alternative gave rise to an
unreasonable risk of injury. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt.
d, at 19-20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994); Duran, 101 N.M. at 747, 688 P.2d at 784. The
distinction between the negligence approach proposed by the Restatement and strict
liability is the time frame in which the risk-benefit calculation is made.
Id. at 61-63. The court then concluded,
If in some future case we are confronted directly with a proffer of evidence on an
advancement or change in the state of the art that was neither known nor knowable at the
time the product was supplied, we may at that time reconsider application of a state-ofthe-art defense to those real circumstances, properly developed under the proffer with
applicable briefs and argument.
Id. at 63. Several decisions since Brooks emphasize the need for a reasonable alternative design as
part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. In Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001),
plaintiff sued a gun manufacturer for injuries he suffered when a handgun was negligently
discharged. The plaintiff alleged that safety features were available that would have indicated to the
user that the gun was loaded and should not be fired. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, the court said:
Whether the type of misuse evident in this case was foreseeable, whether the
existing features of the J-22 are sufficiently safe, and whether it was feasible without
impairing the utility of the gun or being unduly expensive for Bryco and Jennings to
incorporate the advocated safety devices and/or warnings into the design of the J-22, are
all issues for the jury to decide.
Id. at 650. Most persuasive is the decision of the federal district court in Morales v. E.D. Etnyre &
Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. N.M. 2005), in which the Court predicted that the New Mexico
Supreme Court would adopt RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b). The court said:
Etnyre contends that the Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy
the elements for a design defect case in accordance with the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. The Court agrees that, if the Supreme Court of New Mexico were
presented with the precise issue in this case, it would most likely adopt the Restatement
(Third) of Torts[: Products Liability]. Accordingly, the Court will assume that the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability governs this action and that the
Restatement (Third) is the controlling law for the Plaintiffs' claims based on defective
design.
Before the ALI issued [sic] considered or issued the Restatement (Third), New
Mexico had adopted the "risk-utility" test. The Court believes that test required the
plaintiff to prove the existence of an "alternative design" to determine whether the
defendant defectively designed a product. Thus, to the extent that a plaintiff could come
to court and merely criticize a product, the Court believes that the New Mexico law
required the plaintiff to propose an alternative design.
Morales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. It should be noted that whether a reasonable alternative design is
required is an issue separate and apart from the question of whether a manufacturer should be
charged with the knowledge of a risk-avoidance mechanism that was not known at the time of
manufacture but was known at the time of trial. As set forth earlier, the New Mexico Supreme Court
left open the "state of art" question for resolution at a later date. In any event, at the very least, the
New Mexico court seems to require a reasonable alternative design that could be implemented at the
time of trial.
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Rhode Island,'

South Carolina,

°9

Virginia,"' and West Virginia."' We

will, however, comment on the views of three states that we count as
supportive that deserve special comment.
108 Although the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has not yet held that a reasonable
alternative design is required, in an important opinion the high court has cited to the language of
section 2(b) in reversing a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had shown that a reasonable
alternative design was available. In Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712 (RI. 1999),
plaintiff, an employee of New England Ecological Development, Inc., observed that one of the
conveyor belts was running off track. Plaintiff turned off the machine and climbed onto a catwalk to
determine if the conveyor belt was obstructed. While plaintiff was standing on the catwalk, someone
restarted the machine. Somehow, plaintiff lost his balance and thrust his arm into the "nip point" of
the conveyor system. Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 713. The primary issue on appeal was whether the
distributors of component parts of the nip points were entitled to summary judgment since they only
sold the components for a system that was fully integrated at the plant. In a lengthy analysis, the
court adopted section 5 of the Restatement (Third) Products Liability, which states that the
manufacturer of a component part is not liable unless the component part "is defective in itself' or
the seller or distributor of the component "substantially participates in the integration of the
component into the design of the product." Id.at 716 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998)) (emphasis omitted). With regard to one defendant (Colmar), the court
found that there was evidence that could support a jury finding that the distributor was "substantially
involved" in the integration of the component into the final product. Id.at 717. With regard to a
second defendant the court observed:
[W]e are persuaded that a genuine issue of material fact may exist with respect to
whether the pulley's design was defective as a result of [the component manufacturer's]
failure to produce a reasonable alternative design that may have reduced or avoided the
foreseeable risk of harm suffered by Buonanno, which would render the product
defective "in itself' and "at the time of sale or distribution." Specifically, the Restatement
(Third) Torts § 2(b) provides that a product is defective when:
"the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe."
Although this issue was not actually litigated by the parties, the record is clear that
Buonanno produced evidence that a safer design of the pulley was available. Specifically,
in his deposition, John Brunaccini, Colmar's president, testified that [the component part
maker] manufactured (for other customers on a "made-to-order-basis"), a wing pulley
that had steel welded around the circumference of the wings, and that it manufactured
this design at the same time that it manufactured the pulley in question. Brunaccini also
indicated that there was a design known as a "spiral wing pulley" which had circular
pieces wound around the pulley that would cover "the whole thing." Accordingly, we are
satisfied that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether this was a reasonable
alternative design within the meaning of the Restatement. If so, the question remains as to
whether the foreseeable risks of harm posed to plaintiff could have been reduced or
avoided had the alternative design been available and offered ....We recognize that it
may not have been economically feasible . . . to manufacture a wing pulley with this
additional guarding for this particular use and such a factor would bear significantly upon
the reasonableness of this alternative design. These determinations, however, are to be
determined by a fact finder and are not suitable for summary judgment.
Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 717-18. A fair reading of Buonanno is that Rhode Island has adopted not
only section 5 of the Restatement, but also section 2(b). The court, in seeking to define whether the
wing pulley was "defective in itself," clearly relies on the Restatement definition of design defect.
109 An early decision requiring a reasonable alternative design for a design defect is Bragg
v. Hi-Ranger Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (directed verdict for defendant
manufacturer because plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of a "feasible design alternative"). Since
then, several federal courts applying South Carolina law have concluded that proof of a reasonable
alternative design is mandatory in a design defect case. See, e.g., Cohen v. Winnebago Indus., Inc.,
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Nos. 98-1925 & 98-2536, 2000 WL 299459, at *1-*2, *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000) (applying South
Carolina law) (jury found for defendant in a design defect case where plaintiff alleged error in that
the trial judge instructed the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proving a safer alternative design);
id. at *4 ("The argument lacks merit, because providing evidence of the existence of an alternative
safer, feasible design is part of the plaintiffs products liability case under South Carolina law, and
hence the instruction was appropriate."); Campbell v. Gala Indus. Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH,
2006 WL 1073796, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (applying South Carolina law) (defendant's motion
for summary judgment on claim that centrifugal dryer was defectively designed denied because limit
switch that would have avoided the hazard was "technologically and financially feasible"); Disher v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), 371 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767-68, 771 (D.S.C. 2005) (defendant manufacturer of
titanium humeral nail that fractured after implant granted summary judgment because under South
Carolina law it is crucial that a plaintiff show that a "'feasible' or workable, design alternative exists
under the circumstances"); Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495
(D.S.C. 2001) ("[W]hile there is no explicit statement including proof of a safer alternative design as
an element of a product liability case, clearly South Carolina courts have found that failure to
provide such proof can doom a case as a matter of law.").
110 While state courts have not articulated a clear test for design defect, several federal
district court decisions indicate that Virginia would require proof of a reasonable alternative design
as part of plaintiff's prima facie case. In Kesler v. Crown Equipment Corp., Civ. A. No. 93-0644-R,
1994 WL 782904, at *1, *3 (W.D. Va. Jul. 5, 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1995), the federal
district court granted defendant summary judgment because the plaintiff had failed to provide expert
testimony that the alternative design was feasible. The court said:
Even if expert testimony were not required, Kesler's challenge to the alleged design
defect misses the mark. Essentially, Kesler contends that it was technically feasible to
install a guardrail and to use a harness rather than a belt. A feasible design, however is
not necessarily a desirable design. Suggested alterations must be "not only technically
feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and operation of the
product." Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) [Allen required
proof of reasonable alternative design]. Although Kesler's suggested changes are likely
practicable in terms of cost, Crown's manager of product engineering testified that those
changes were not practicable given the nature of the work stockpicker operators perform
and the stockpicker's overall function, design and operation.
Id. at *3. More recently, in Tunnell v. FordMotor Co., 385 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583 (W.D. Va. 2005),
the court held that the trial court's exclusion of plaintiffs expert witness as to the alleged
defectiveness of a Jaguar for its failure to have a battery cutoff device, which would have prevented
a fire after a collision, was not error and that it was proper to grant the defendant-manufacturer a
directed verdict. We set forth the court's analysis at length because it so clearly demonstrates the
court's reliance on section 2(b) of the Restatement and its comments as the correct interpretation of
Virginia law:
Defectiveness analysis considers whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous for
ordinary or foreseeable use." Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420 (4th
Cir. 1993). As discussed in the Memorandum Opinion, this "foreseeable uses" standard
necessarily requires experts to take a broad view of the product they analyze. Because the
foreseeable uses of some products are wide-ranging, a product may require multiple-and
potentially competing-design elements to protect against the various foreseeable uses of
the product. Precisely because of this fact, one design element protecting against a
foreseeable use can easily frustrate or even impair the value of another measure
protecting against a different foreseeable use. For this reason, a product designer may
argue in its defense that a proposed alternative design actually increases the risk that
injury will result from a different, but equally foreseeable, use of the product. When such
an argument is made, a plaintiffs expert cannot simply make a defectiveness judgment
based upon only one particular type of accident. Rather, he must analyze whether the
current design, taken as a whole, reasonably protects against the other injuries that could
occur due to foreseeable uses. This result is a necessary consequence of the "foreseeable
use" standard because any other standard would render a designer susceptible to
inconsistent judgments on defectiveness. In one lawsuit, the designer could be liable for
failing to include a certain protective device; in another, he could be liable for choosing
to include it. Here, Ford unquestionably argued that Wallingford's proposed device
would impose safety risks rendering the Mustang more dangerous. Because Wallingford
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Arkansas statutorily embraces the consumer expectations test." l2
However, in Dancy v. Hyster Co.,"3 the court held that unless the case is
never addressed the question of whether the vehicle taken as a whole was unreasonably
dangerous for ordinary or foreseeable uses, his opinion was meaningless on the issue of
defectiveness.
Ultimately, the preceding analysis merges with the issue Plaintiff raises in his motion
regarding the risk-benefit analysis. The risk-benefit analysis is not, as Plaintiffargues,
some additionaltechnical hurdle that this Court is imposing where none existed before.
Rather, it is a basic concept imbedded in any defectiveness analysis, requiring that a
proposed alternative design actually cure a product of its alleged defects. Contrary to
Plaintif's contention, Virginia, along with the Third Restatement of Torts, does require
evidence from a plaintiff that an alternative design truly provides more benefits than
risks.
Although the Third Restatement does not require a plaintiff "to establish with
particularity the costs and benefits associated with adoption of the suggested alternative
design" in light of the "inherent limitations on access to relevant data," it nevertheless
clearly does contemplate that a plaintiff will produce some affirmative evidence as to the
risk-benefit analysis. As Plaintiff acknowledges, the Restatement is quite clear on this
point:
When evaluating the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety
of the product must be considered. It is not sufficient that the alternative design
would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if it would
have introduced into the product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. f(1997). Plaintiff acknowledges
that some jurisdictions have interpreted the Third Restatement to require proof than [sic]
an alternative design has passed a risk-benefit analysis, but he argues that neither the
Virginia Supreme Court nor the Virginia General Assembly has expressly adopted the
Third Restatement. Even assuming arguendo that Virginia has rejected express adoption
of the Third Restatement in its entirety, however, this fact alone does not suggest that
principles from the Third Restatement are not integrated in Virginia common law. As
with any area of law, persuasive authority in the form of case law from other jurisdictions
and restatements is instructive in identifying Virginia common law rules.
Tunnell, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 584-85 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
I In Morningstarv. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979),
the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the standard of reasonable safety, as determined "by what a
reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards should have been at the time the product was made."
Id. at 683 (emphasis added). This language can only be read to require the production of evidence of
a reasonable alternative design, to gauge what "should have been." Indeed, in Church v. Wesson, 385
S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989), the court upheld a directed verdict for defendant, in a strict liability
context, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish feasibility of a proffered alternative
design. Id. at 396 ("[W]e find that appellant failed to establish a prima facie right of recovery....
[Witness] suggested that [a certain design] may have been a more appropriate [one but] it was
undisputed that the [alternative] was not feasible .. ").
In Garlinger v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 16 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2001)
(applying West Virginia law), the court upheld a jury verdict for defendant in a case where plaintiff
had been burned by coffee served at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit. The plaintiff argued that the trial
court had wrongfully excluded expert testimony that coffee served at such a high temperature was
unreasonably dangerous. In upholding the trial court's ruling, the court cited to McMahon v. Bunn0-Matic, 150 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that an expert must provide
testimony comparing the benefit of design changes of serving coffee at 150 degrees Fahrenheit
against the cost in pleasure reduction to prove a design defect case. Since plaintiff's expert had not
made such a comparison, his testimony was inadmissible. Thus since the expert could not provide
credible evidence of a reasonable alternative design, his testimony was not relevant and could not
support a finding that coffee served at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit was unreasonably dangerous.
112 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7)(A) (2007).
113 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997).
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one in which the plaintiff can draw a res ipsa-like inference of defect, the
plaintiff must prove that a safer alternative design was available. In that
case plaintiff was injured when a lift-truck overturned, pinning his right
foot and leading to the amputation of his right leg below the knee. Dancy
sued the lift-truck manufacturer alleging defective design because the
truck did not have a cage or guard around the compartment to protect the
operator from injury. The district court found that the plaintiffs expert
testimony as to an alternative design did not meet Daubert criteria." 4
Without credible evidence as to the alternative design the defendant was
entitled to summary judgment." 5 The court said:
Plaintiff does not contend that the lift truck malfunctioned in any way; he
contends the lift truck was not designed properly because it lacked a safety
device. Lay jurors would tend to understand products that do not work; they are
not likely to possess "common understanding" about how products are
designed. We cannot expect lay jurors to possess understanding about whether
the mesh guard envisioned by Dr. Forbes would be capable of withstanding the
force involved in a fall and be effective in protecting Plaintiff from the injury
he received ....We cannot expect a lay juror to know whether the mesh guard
itself would cause more injuries than it creates by, for instance, breaking and
puncturing the lift truck's operator. Although Dancy does not have the burden
of proving that his "alternative safer design was available and feasible in terms
of cost, practicality and technological possibility," French v. Grove Mfg., Co.,
656 F.2d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1981), he still has the burden of proving the
existence of a defect by showing that a safer alternative design actually exists.
He cannot carry this burden without proving that his proposed design will
actually work, and we believe the answer to this question is beyond the ken of
lay jurors.'16

Several other federal court decisions relying on Dancy have granted
summary judgment because plaintiff failed to proffer credible expert
testimony as to the availability of a practical safer alternative design." 7 In
a recent case, Freeman v. CaterpillarIndustrial,Inc.,"' the court noted
that although plaintiff is not required to prove the economic feasibility of
an alternative design as part of her prima facie case, if "defendant comes
forward with evidence to demonstrate the prohibitive cost, impracticality,
or technological unfeasibility""' of the alternative design, the case need
114

Id. at 651-54.

115 Id.at 652-53.
116

Id.at 653-54 (emphasis added).

117 See, e.g., Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003) (relying on

Dancy, the Court held that the plaintiffs expert did not meet Daubert criteria and absent expert
testimony on a safer alternative design, the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case, and
defendant was therefore entitled to summary judgment); Jones v. Gott Corp., 4:00CV00279 GTE,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26252, at *4, 6 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 6, 2001) (defendant was granted summary
judgment against a claim that a plastic container was defectively designed when it did not contain a
flame arrester, thus allowing gasoline in the container to spray out and bum the plaintiff; plaintiff's
expert did not meet Daubert criteria and without that testimony, plaintiff could not meet its burden
of provinp that a safer alternative existed).
No. 3:02-CV-00039 GTE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23840 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 28, 2007).
119 Id. at *20.
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not be submitted to a jury "because there is a point at which it must be
said that the alternative design will not work."12 Thus, notwithstanding
that an Arkansas statute embraces the consumer expectations test, the
courts have required the plaintiff to provide evidence of a workable
alternative design. And, if a defendant demonstrates that the proffered
alternative design is not economically feasible, the plaintiff will suffer
either summary judgment or a directed verdict. Although the Arkansas
test for design defect does not line up in all its particulars with section
2(b) of the ProductsLiability Restatement,2 ' it is a far cry from a strict
liability consumer expectations test. Plaintiff is required to proffer a
technologically feasible, safer alternative design and, even when proven,
it can be defeated by evidence that it is not economically feasible.
Utah, also, has a statute that predicates liability on a product
being "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in that
community. 1 22 Notwithstanding this statutory language, the court in
Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ' 23 held that "[t]he statute does not create

a cause of action" but instead limits the plaintiffs right to recover to
cases where the product fails to meet consumer expectations.2 4 In
addition, however, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable alternative
design was available at the time the product was put into commerce. 125
Once again a court has held that consumer expectations language in a
statute is not determinative. Instead the court, citing to the Products
Liability Restatement,126 held that to make out a prima facie case for
design defect, a plaintiff must present credible evidence of a reasonable
alternative design.'27
Finally, we include New York among the jurisdictions that
require proof of a reasonable alternative design. The leading case
espousing this view is Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.,'28 a
landmark case in New York products liability jurisprudence. Products
120

Id. at*21.

Under section 2(b), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the reasonable
alternative design is technologically and economically feasible.
122 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-702 (2008).
123 328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003).
124 Id. at 1278-79 ("The statute does not create a cause of action. It sets limits on any
121

cause of action created by some other source of law. It states that in a products liability suit, a
product will be regarded as defective only if at the time of sale the product was 'unreasonably
dangerous'....").
125 Id. at 1279 ("The statute... imposes a necessary condition for a cause
of action. The
statute does not state what is sufficient for a cause of action. Because Utah does not have another
statute setting forth the elements of a products liability cause of action, the sufficient conditions for
such a cause of action must come from the common law .... This circuit ...has interpreted Utah
law to require that the plaintiff prove the practicability of a safer design.").
26 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998).
127 Brown, 328 F.3d at 1279 (describing risk-utility/alternative design test used
in Allen v.
Minnstar,Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir. 1993)).
128 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983).
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Liability cognoscenti may counter that in Denny v. Ford Motor Co.,' 29
the New York Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the
consumer expectations test as a method for establishing design defect. 3
To be sure, in Denny the court approved a separate instruction based on
the failure of the product to meet consumer expectations... because the
product in question, a small utility vehicle, was marketed for highway
driving. The court noted that the vehicle was reasonably safe as an "offroad" vehicle but that, when traveling at normal highway speeds, its
center of gravity was such that it was prone to roll-over accidents, thus
disappointing consumer expectations.' 32 The role of marketing as the
lynchpin for use of the consumer expectations test was emphasized by
Judge Guido Calabresi in a subsequent decision, Castro v. QVC Network,
Inc. 133 In that case, defendant advertised a roasting pan on a TV homeshopping channel as suitable for cooking a twenty-five pound turkey.
Plaintiff bought the roasting pan and used it to prepare a twenty-five
pound turkey on Thanksgiving. She was injured when she attempted to
remove the turkey from the pan. While wearing insulated mittens, she
gripped the pan's handles with the first two fingers of each hand. She
could not use more than two fingers because that was the maximum grip
allowed by the small size of the handles. As she removed the pan, the
turkey tipped toward her, spilling hot drippings and fat onto her foot and
ankle causing second- and third-degree bums.'34 The plaintiff had pled
claims in strict liability in tort (risk-utility) and breach of implied
warranty of merchantability (consumer expectations). The federal district
court applying New York law instructed only on the strict tort claim. The
jury found for the defendant. In reversing for failing to give the
consumer expectations instruction, Judge Calabresi noted that "in Denny,
the Court of Appeals pointed out that the fact that a product's overall
benefits might outweigh its overall risks does not preclude the possibility
that consumers may have been misled into using the product in a context
in which it was dangerously unsafe."' 35 If not for the specific
representation as to its suitability for roasting a twenty-five pound
turkey, it was a safe roasting pan. However, Judge Calabresi noted:
But, it was also the case that the pan was advertised as suitable for a particular
use--cooking a twenty-five pound turkey ....The product was, therefore, sold
as appropriately used for roasting a twenty-five pound turkey.
In such circumstances, New York law is clear that a general charge on strict
products liability based on the risk-utility approach does not suffice. The jury
129

662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).

130

Id. at 738.

131 Id. at 732-33.
132

Id.at 732.

133 139 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1998).
134 Id.at
135 Id.at

115-16.
118.
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could have found that the roasting pan's overall utility for cooking low volume
foods outweighed the risk of injury when cooking heavier foods, but that the
product was nonetheless unsafe for the purpose for which it was marketed and
sold-roasting a twenty-five pound turkey and, as such, was defective under
the consumer expectations test. That36being so, the appellants were entitled to a
separate breach of warranty charge.1

In a footnote, Judge Calabresi noted that in both Denny and Castro the
product had been marketed as suitable for "dual purposes" but, in fact,
was dangerous for use in one of the modes.137
Given the explicit representations in Denny and Castro, they
might be better classified as express warranty claims. But whether
classified as consumer expectations or express warranty they represent a
tiny share of New York design defect cases. Once one gets past the few
instances where explicit representations support the use of the consumer
expectations test,"' the case law in New York is replete with decisions by
courts that defendants are entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiffs failed to introduce credible evidence of a reasonable alternative
design.' The constancy and volume of decisions to that effect leave
little doubt as to the law applicable in New York in classic design cases.
136
137
138
139

Id. at 119.
Id.at n.l1.
See supra notes 128, 132 and accompanying text.
A substantial number of decisions set forth the requirement of a reasonable alternative

design as a prerequisite for a prima facie case of defective design. See, e.g., Rypkema v. Time Mfg.
Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (summary judgment granted to defendant against
plaintiff's claim that aerial lift bucket was defectively designed because under New York law
"plaintiff is required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative" design; plaintiffs expert failed
to show the practical availability of such an alternative design); Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., 75 F.
Supp. 2d 225, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (court granted defendant's motion to vacate jury verdict against
plaintiff's claim that an airbag was defectively designed, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. f (1998), and held that plaintiff must prove a reasonable alternative design
that would be safer for all users and it is not sufficient if the alternative design would have preexisted
the plaintiff's injury); Deere v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 175 F.R.D. 157, 161-62 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (defendant tire company granted summary judgment against plaintiff's claim that he was
injured by explosion of defectively designed tire because plaintiff did not establish reasonable
alternative design as required under New York law); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d
204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) ("The plaintiff.., is under an obligation to present evidence that the product,
as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was
feasible to design the product in a safer manner .. ");Magadan v. Interlake Packaging Corp., 845
N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (App. Div. 2007) (summary judgment for defendant upheld on claim that a book
stitcher was defectively designed since "plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether at the
time the stitcher was manufactured, it was feasible to design it in a safer manner); Felix v. Akzo
Nobel Coatings, Inc., 692 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (App. Div. 1999) (granting summary judgment because
"there was no competent evidence set forth by the plaintiff that there was an alternative, safer design
and the evidence clearly indicates the volatile solvent contained in the defendant's quick-drying
lacquer sealer is critical to the product's performance"); Perez v. Radar Realty, No. 24414/1998,
2005 WL 946710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2005), aff'd, 824 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 2006) (summary
judgment for defendant in a design defect claim against manufacturer of quick-drying lacquer sealer
that injured plaintiff when it caught fire since there was no feasible alternative proffered by plaintiff
that would meet the performance standards of the defendant's product); see also Clinton v. Brown &
Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (summary judgment granted to
defendant on plaintiff's claim that cigarettes were not reasonably safe when subject to risk/utility
balancing). The court in Clinton began its analysis by saying:
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Risk-Utility Balancing: ReasonableAlternative Design Not
Required

We have already noted that unless a jurisdiction is prepared to
adopt category liability, the inevitable conclusion that one must draw
from adopting risk-utility balancing is that plaintiff must prove a
reasonable alternative design. When one does risk-utility balancing one
must judge the product on trial and compare it with some hypothetical
design that could have been adopted. Reasonable alternative design is the
answer to the comparative balancing process; it is not a factor in the
equation as to whether the product was reasonably designed.
Thus, states like Colorado,'4 ° Illinois,' 4' New Hampshire,' and
43
Nevada' may say that reasonable alternative design is not a sina qua
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the existence of a feasible
alternative design is a sine qua non of the design defect claim ... or whether it is merely
one of several nonexclusive factors to be considered by the factfinder . . . . For the
reasons stated below, the Court concludes that proof of a feasible alternative design is a
prerequisite to establish a prima facie design defect claim under New York law.
Clinton, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 646. The court then reasoned as follows:
Although "the availability of a safer design" is listed by the court in Voss among several
"nonexclusive" factors to be considered by the jury, the court in Voss also clearly stated
that "[t]he plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product,
as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm
andit was feasible to design the product in a safer manner." This language indicates that
the existence of a feasible alternative design is not just a "nonexclusive" factor, but rather
is a requirement for Plaintiffs prima facie case. Accordingly, New York courts have
required Plaintiffs to demonstrate the feasibility of a safer alternative design to establish a
prima facie design defect case.
Id. (quoting Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (1983) (emphasis added)) (citations
omitted); see also Sorto-Romero v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., No. 05-CV-5172 (SJF)(AKT), 2007 WL
2816191, at *7-*10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (applying New York law) (plaintiff's expert testifying
to alternative design that would have required an interlock mechanism on a wood shaper did not
meet Daubert standards and plaintiff thus failed to make out a prima facie case for design defect);
Kass ex rel. Kass v. West Bend Co., No. 02-CV-3719 (NGG), 2004 WL 2475606, at *13 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 2004), af'd, 158 F. App'x 352 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law) (granting summary
judgment to defendant-manufacturer of a coffee maker that scalded infant plaintiff with hot water
when it turned over on the grounds that the alternative design proposed by plaintiff was not properly
tested and thus did not meet Daubert standards); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying New York law) (plaintiffs expert opinion on an
alternative design of a child-proof cigarette lighter was not subjected to testing and did not meet
Daubert standards). In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment the federal district
court in Colon ex rel. Molina said: "The presence of this factor in a design defect case also ensures
that the focus of the jury's deliberation is on whether the manufacturer could have designed a safer
product, not on whether an expert's proposed but untested hypothesis might bear fruit." Id.
140 Colorado first adopted strict liability in Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583
P.2d 276, 280
(Colo. 1978), in accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In Ortho
PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986), overruled in part by Armentrout v.
FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992) (overruling Heath solely on the issue of placement of burden
of proof for design defect-placing the burden on the plaintiff), Colorado "adopted a straightforward
risk-benefit analysis." See Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997) (plaintiff
introduced evidence of an alternative design that would have avoided the injury; court granted
judgment for defendant since there was no credible evidence that on balance the alternative design
was safer). While the risk-utility standard incorporates consumer expectations, the high court
explicitly rejected a design standard based exclusively on a consumer expectations test. See
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non to make out a prima facie case for design defect. However, in these
states, all classic design cases in which plaintiff has reached the jury are
cases in which plaintiff has proved an alternative design. No plaintiff has
ever reached the jury in the absence of such proof. The interesting
question is why would courts make such a serious theoretical error? Why
would they insist that reasonable alternative design is only a relevant
factor in risk-utility balancing when, in actuality, they treat it as
controlling?
One reason is that many courts have relied on a highly influential
article published in 1973 by the late Dean and Professor John Wade. In
that article, Wade set forth seven risk-utility factors that should be
considered in deciding whether a product design is unreasonably
dangerous."4 One of the Wade factors is the availability of a safer design:
"[t]he availability of a substitute product would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe."' 45 In a different setting, we observed that Wade was
referring to the empirical question as to whether an alternative design
was technologically feasible, whereas the issue of reasonable alternative
Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987). While proof of a reasonable
alternative design is part of Colorado's risk-utility standard, it "is not always necessary." See
Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 185 n.l (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5
(Or. 1978)). Thus, according to Wilson and as cited by the high court, it would appear that the only
exceptions to the reasonable alternative design requirement in Colorado are those cases where the
product has negligible utility and high risk.
141 See supra Part Iv.A.
142 In Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001), the
court adopted the risk-utility approach as the governing standard for design defect litigation. It held,
however, that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design as part of
its prima facie case. The court rejected the reasonable alternative design requirement of the Products
Liability Restatement as placing too heavy a burden on the plaintiff. Instead, whether a reasonable
alternative design was available would be one of many factors to be taken into consideration in
deciding whether a product was defective. id.at 1182; see also Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330,
332 (N.H. 1997) (failure to incorporate child-proof features in cigarette lighter to be governed by
risk-utility analysis). It is worthwhile to note that although the court held that proof of a reasonable
alternative design is not required in each of the above cases, plaintiff offered proof of a reasonable
alternative design to support its position that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184; see also Collins v. Tool Exch. LLC., No. Civ. 01-302-M, 2002 WL
31395929, at *2 (D.N.H. Oct. 16, 2002) (summary judgment on design defect claim denied; plaintiff
noted three design defects, the elimination of which would have rendered power saw safer).
143 Although Nevada courts have referred to the failure of a design to meet reasonable
consumer expectations in explaining pro-plaintiff decisions, they have done so in cases involving
product malfunctions. See, e.g., Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Nev. 1970). In
more recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Nevada has made clear that plaintiffs may reach the
jury by proving that an alternative design was available at time of sale, although "[a]ltemative design
is [only] one factor for the jury to consider when evaluating whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous." McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987); see also Robinson v.
G.G.C. Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 525-26 (Nev. 1991) (holding that the failure to admit evidence of
alternative design was grounds to reverse jury verdict for defendant). Notwithstanding this "only one
factor" language in McCourt, no case in Nevada has been found, not involving product malfunction,
in which a plaintiff has reached the jury with a design claim without proof of a reasonable alternative
design.
144 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MisS. L.J. 825,
837-38 (1973). For a critique of the Wade factors, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 9, § 8.4.
145 Wade, supra note 144, at 837.
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design looks to the normative question as to whether the alternative
design should have been implemented.1 46 However, that just makes the
problem worse. How can the technological feasibility of an alternative
design simply be a factor in deciding whether a product is defectively
designed? As noted earlier, if there is no technologically feasible
alternative, then the plaintiff perforce is attacking the product category.
We are constrained to conclude that Wade was simply wrong in listing
the availability of an alternative design as one factor among many in
deciding whether a product design is unreasonably dangerous. A partial
defense for Wade may be that in 1973 the issue of product category
liability, although an early concern of products liability scholars at the
time section 402A was adopted, 147 was not on his radar screen. We
reinvigorated the issue and popularized the phrase "category liability" in
an article published in 1991 ;148 since then, scholars' 49 and courts 5 ° have
discussed the subject. Wade could not have been sensitive to the
possibility that his formulation might lead to category liability.
We conclude that the view that a court can embrace risk-utility
balancing and yet insist that the availability of a reasonable alternative
design is simply one factor in the equation has no practical significance.
The only cases in which plaintiffs successfully dodge summary judgment
without proof of a reasonable alternative design are those covered by
section 3 of the Restatement, which allows a plaintiff to draw an
inference of defect when the product fails in its manifestly intended
function. 5 ' This res ipsa-like inference has been widely recognized,'
and the Restatement specifically provides that in those cases no
See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 888-89.
147 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 6.2; Joseph A. Page, Generic
146

Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853
(1983).
148 See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier,supra note 11, at 1297.
149 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 10.3; Carl T. Bogus, War on
the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REv. 1, 8, 30, 36
(1995); Owen, supra note 11; Ellen G. Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in the Eye; Product Category
Liability andAlternative FeasibleDesigns in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429 (1994).
150 See, e.g., Becker v. Baron Bros., 649 A.2d 613, 620-21 (N.J. 1994) (in rejecting trial
court's jury instructions that all asbestos products were to be found defective as a matter of law and
endorsing use of risk-utility analysis instead, court cited to Henderson & Twerski, Closing the
Frontier,supra note 11, at 1314-15, for evidence that category liability law did not control in any
jurisdiction); Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 855 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2008),
aff'd sub nom. Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 11 N.Y.3d 545 (2008). For a
comprehensive discussion of the case law on category liability, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW, supra note 9, § 10.3.
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
152 See, e.g., Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
Illinois law); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dent-X Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 3:05 CV 1019(TPS), 2007 WL
911841, at *3-*4 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3
(1998)) (applying Connecticut law); Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J.
1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998)); Speller ex rel. Miller v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998)).
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reasonable alternative need be proffered.'53 It may be that some courts are
put off by the language of section 2(b), which seems to mandate a
reasonable alternative design in all product design cases. Both section 2,
comment f,'54 and section 3, comment b,'55 make it exquisitely clear that
the Restatement does not mandate that result. In short, in jurisdictions
that use risk-utility balancing as the test for design in classic design
defect cases, no decisions have been reported in which plaintiffs have
been able to reach juries without evidence that a reasonable alternative
design was available that would have reduced or eliminated the risk of
injury.

153

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998) ("[W]hen the

incident ... is one that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect, and evidence in the particular
case establishes that the harm was not solely the result of causes other than product defect . .. , it
should not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of proving whether the failure resulted from
a manufacturer defect or from a defect in the design of the product.").
154 Section 2, commentfprovides:
While a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced
the foreseeable risks of harm, Subsection (b) does not require the plaintiff to produce
expert testimony in every case. Cases arise in which the feasibility of a reasonable
alternative design is obvious and understandable to laypersons and therefore expert
testimony is unnecessary to support a finding that the product should have been designed
differently and more safely. For example, when a manufacturer sells a soft stuffed toy
with hard plastic buttons that are easily removable and likely to choke and suffocate a
small child who foreseeably attempts to swallow them, the plaintiff should be able to
reach the trier of fact with a claim that buttons on such a toy should be an integral part of
the toy's fabric itself (or otherwise be unremovable by an infant) without hiring an expert
to demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative safer design. Furthermore, other products
already available on the market may serve the same or very similar function at lower risk
and at comparable cost. Such products may serve as reasonable alternatives to the product
in question.
Id. § 2 cmt. f.
155 Section 3, comment b allows an inference of design defect without proof of
a
reasonable alternative design:
Although the rules in this Section, for the reasons just stated, most often apply to
manufacturing defects, occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction
in a manner identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect.
Thus, an aircraft may inadvertently be designed in such a way that, in new condition and
while flying within its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly and
unexpectedly fall off, causing harm. In theory, of course, the plaintiff in such a case
would be able to show how other units in the same production line were designed,
leading to a showing of a reasonable alternative design under § 2(b). As a practical
matter, however, when the incident involving the aircraft is one that ordinarily occurs as a
result of product defect, and evidence in the particular case establishes that the harm was
not solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at time of sale, it should
not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of proving whether the failure resulted
from a manufacturing defect or from a defect in the design of the product. Section 3
allows the trier of fact to draw the inference that the product was defective whether due to
a manufacturing defect or a design defect. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff need
not specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction.

Id. § 3 cmt. b.
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The Two-Prong Test for Defect

Some jurisdictions apply a two-prong test for defect under which
a plaintiff can establish design defect by demonstrating either that (1) the
product failed to meet consumer expectations; or (2) the product failed to
meet risk-utility standards. Arizona,'56 Alaska, 5 7 California,'58
Connecticut, 59 Florida, 6 ' Hawaii, 6 ' Ohio, 62 Oregon,'63 Puerto Rico," 4
Tennessee,65 and Washington" 6 appear to fall in this camp.
156

See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879, 881-82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc);

Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 962-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
157 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979) (citing Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978)) (adopting California's two-prong test
for imposing design-based liability), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act effective June 11,
1986, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 139 (1986), as recognized by Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14
P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000). Under this test, a product is defective:
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or
(2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on balance
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58. In General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth,965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska
1998), the Supreme Court of Alaska reaffirmed its use of the consumer expectations test without
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design.
158 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58; see also discussion accompanying notes infra 170174.
159 See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997); see
infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
160 Florida case law supports the two-prong test for defect. See, e.g., Force v. Ford Motor
Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). A large number of cases that rely on the
consumer expectations test are cases that would be decided identically under section 3 of the
ProductsLiability Restatement. As the court notes in Force, Florida law is not clear as to the line of
demarcation between cases that can be decided under the consumer expectations test and those
which require risk-utility balancing. Id. at 106-07. The court does, however, note that there are cases
of such complexity that the ordinary consumer would not know what to expect and would require
risk-utility balancing to set the standard for defect. Id. at 109. From the onset the Florida courts
acknowledged that the consumer expectations test is problematic in classic design defect cases. In
the much cited case of Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court
said:
The consumer expectation standard, though adequate to identify unintended
manufactured defects, is more difficult to apply as to the other two generally recognized
types of product defects: (1) design defects-those which are due to design error because
unforeseen hazards accompany normal use of the product created according to design,
and (2) defects resulting from misinformation or inadequate warnings. As to the last two
defects, the standard is said to be a very vague and imprecise one because the ordinary
consumer cannot be said to have expectations as to safety regarding many features of
complexly made products that are purchased, such as the risk of fire from the way
gasoline tanks are installed in cars, or the magnitude of risks involved in vehicles
overturning. Due to the difficulty in applying the consumer expectation standard to all
types of product defects, many thoughtful commentators have suggested that it should be
rejected, particularly as to those defects arising from design, in favor of a test that would
weigh the utility of the design versus the magnitude of the inherent risk.
Id. at 1145. More recently, in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467, 473-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007), the issue before the court was whether it should adopt section 2(b) of the Products
Liability Restatement in the context of a claim alleging a design defect in cigarettes. The court found
that plaintiff had not presented evidence of a reasonable alternative design and upheld a jury verdict
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based on the consumer expectations test. Id. The case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court
and it at first accepted jurisdiction to review the intermediate appellate court's decision. See Liggett
Group Inc. v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 2008). Then after oral argument, the court declined
jurisdiction. Id. Florida law thus remains uncertain as to when it is proper to use the consumer
expectations test and when a case requires risk-utility balancing.
161 Acoba v. Gen. Tire Co., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999). Though the Acoba court said
that plaintiff could proceed under both consumer expectations and risk/utility, plaintiff introduced
evidence of a design alternative that would have avoided the injury. Id.
162 Ohio has a bifurcated statute governing design-based liability. The statute, OHIO
REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (A)-(F), provides two avenues for imposing design-based liability. "[A]
product design is in a defective condition to the user or consumer if (1) it is more dangerous than an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2)
if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk inherent in such design." Knitz v.
Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982). Despite presenting alternate bases of designbased liability, subsection (F) provides:
A product is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time the product left the
control of its manufacturer, a practical and technically feasible alternative design or
formulation was not available that would have prevented the harm for which the claimant
seeks to recover compensatory damages without substantially impairing the usefulness or
intended purpose of the product.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (LexisNexis 2005). Ohio courts largely track the abovementioned statutory requirements but support the proposition that a plaintiff can proceed either
under consumer expectations or risk-utility balancing. See Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 599 N.E.2d
723, 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Aldridge v. Reckart Equip. Co., No. 04CA17, 2006 WL 2716696, at
*11 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006).
163 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (2007) adopts section 402A, including comments a through
m, as the law governing products liability in Oregon. In McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d
320, 329-30 (Or. 2001), the Oregon Supreme Court said that it was bound by the legislative
determination set forth in section 402A, comment i (consumer expectations test). The court then
said:
Plaintiff acknowledges that evidence related to risk-utility balancing of that kind may
be necessary to show that a product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would have expected. However, plaintiff disputes the Court of Appeals' holding that,
under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff must introduce such evidence. See
McCathern, 160 Or. App. at 211, 985 P.2d 804 (proof of safer practicable alternative
design essential to consumer risk-utility theory). According to plaintiff, evidence related
to risk-utility balancing, as described above, is required only under the now-defunct
reasonable manufacturer test. See Wilson v. PiperAircraft Corporation, 282 Or. 61, 6769, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (relying on Phillips's reasonable manufacturer test; requiring
that, when risk-utility balancing and proof of design alternative are necessary, proof must
include evidence that alternative design was practicable).
We agree that evidence related to risk-utility balancing, which may include proof that
a practicable and feasible design alternative was available, will not always be necessary
to prove that a product's design is defective and unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that the
product failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations. However, because the parties did
not dispute that evidence related to risk-utility balancing was necessary in this case, we
leave for another day the question under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires a
plaintiff to support a product liability design-defect claim with evidence related to riskutility balancing of the kind discussed above.
McCathern, 23 P.3d at 331-32.
164 In Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1998), involving
a claim that an airbag in an automobile was defectively designed, the federal court of appeals
reviewed Puerto Rico's products liability law in affirming a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffappellee. The court's Erie-educated guess regarding Puerto Rican law, based on prior decisions by
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, was that the two-prong approach adopted in California in Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (1978), applied. Collazo-Santiago, 149 F.3d at 25-26.
Notwithstanding expert testimony from defendant's witnesses that the benefits of the airbag
HeinOnline -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1099 2008-2009

BROOKLYN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

To the extent that these states utilize risk-utility balancing, we
have already demonstrated that it inevitably leads to requiring proof of a
reasonable alternative design. 6 7 The questions of real import concern
how the courts administer the consumer expectations test. What are the
parameters of the test? By what barometer does one measure whether
consumer expectations have been disappointed? Unless the consumer
expectations test is carefully cabined, it is open to telling criticisms. First,
for many products, consumers do not have clear expectations as to how
the product will perform when subjected to a broad range of uses.
Second, under the consumer expectations test, defect and causation are
merged. Plaintiffs need only allege disappointment of expectations and
injury. Third, since risk-utility is not an issue, the product as designed
may provide greater overall safety than an alternative product that would
meet consumer expectations and would have avoided a particular
plaintiffs harm. Fourth, consumer expectations may vary; thus placing

outweighed its risks overall and that no reasonable alternative design was feasible, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that after the plaintiff proved that deployment of the airbag caused the
second-degree burns to the plaintiff's face, "the burden shifted to the defendant to establish that the
benefits of the design outweighed its risks .... The jury was not required to believe the testimony of
the defendant's expert witness regarding the feasibility of an alternative design or the other Barker
factors .
I.."
Id. at 27-28. More recently, in Fremaintv. FordMotor Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26, 3031 (D.P.R. 2003), the federal district court, applying Puerto Rican law, granted summary judgment
for defendant in a case involving second-collision injuries suffered in a single-car accident. The
court held that the consumer expectation prong of the Barker two-prong approach did not apply
because the case involved complex technical matters of automobile design, and the plaintiff failed to
introduce expert testimony to establish that an alternative, safer design was feasible that would have
avoided plaintiffs injuries in the accident. Id. at 29-30.
165 Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001); see also discussion infra
notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
166 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.720.030(3) (1981) imposes strict liability for design defects and
provides that "[i]n determining whether a product was not reasonably safe under this section, the
trier of fact shall consider whether the product was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer."
It would at first blush seem that Washington allows a plaintiff to prevail under a pure
consumer expectations test. However, in several cases the court has included risk-utility factors as
necessary to determine whether plaintiff meets the consumer expectations test. See, e.g., Bruns v.
PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), where the court said:
Alternatively, the plaintiff may establish manufacturer liability by showing the product
was unsafe as contemplated by a reasonable consumer. RCW 7.72.030(3). Several factors
contribute to this consumer expectation determination, including "[t]he relative cost of
the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk[.]"
Id. at 474 (quoting Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)); see
also Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), where the court said:
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors
must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm
from the claimed defect and the cost andfeasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk
may be relevant in a particularcase. In other instances the nature of the product or the
nature of the claimed defect may make otherfactors relevant to the issue.
Id. at 426.

167

See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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the manufacturer in the impossible position of being subject to liability
no matter how the product is designed.
For these reasons, courts in these two-prong states have been
very sensitive to the limitations of the consumer expectations test and
have confined its application to cases that instantiate res ipsa-like product
failures i.e., where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended
function. We have made reference to section 3 of the ProductsLiability
Restatement earlier in this paper. At this juncture we set it out in full.
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result
68 of causes other than product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.

To the extent that a court recognizes that if a product does not
fall within section 3 the plaintiff must establish that the product fails to
meet risk-utility norms, the law of that jurisdiction is perfectly congruent
with the Products Liability Restatement. For example, in its leading case
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg.,169 the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the
consumer expectations test is adequate for manufacturing defect cases
but will only "sometimes work well" in design cases, as consumers will
very often not know what to expect of a complex or unfamiliar design.
More recently in Golonka v. General Motors Corp.,17 the Arizona Court
of Appeals reiterated that the consumer expectations test works well for
manufacturing defect cases and has "limited utility" in design defect
cases where risk-utility standards must govern. 7' California, the
originator of the two-prong test in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,172 later
found it necessary in Soule v. General Motors Corp.73
' to explain that the
consumer expectations test is very limited in scope. The court said:
As we have seen, the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which
the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the
product's design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective
regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design.. . . ' [T]he jury
may not be left free to find a violation of ordinary consumer expectations
whenever it chooses. Unless the facts actually permit an inference that the
product's performance did not meet the minimum safety expectations of its
168

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

169

709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
65 P.3d 956, 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).

t70

§ 3 (1998).

171 Id.

172

573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).

173 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
174 Id. at 308.
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ordinary users, the jury must engage in75 the balancing of risks and benefits
required by the second prong of Barker.1

In two telling footnotes the court outlined the proper role of each of the
two prongs. As to the consumer expectations test, the court said the
following:
For example, the ordinary consumers of modem automobiles may and do
expect that such vehicles will be designed so as not to explode while idling at
stoplights, experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave the
dealership or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-hour collisions. If the
plaintiff in a product liability action proved that a vehicle's design produced
such a result, the jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform76as
safely as its ordinary consumers would expect, and was therefore defective. 1

The Court went out of its way in rejecting the attempt by plaintiff to
broaden the scope of the consumer expectations test saying:
Plaintiff insists that manufacturers should be forced to design their products to
meet the "objective" safety demands of a "hypothetical" reasonable consumer
who is fully informed about what he or she should expect. Hence, plaintiff
reasons, the jury may receive expert advice on "reasonable" safety expectations
for the product. However, this function is better served by the risk-benefit
prong of Barker.There, juries receive expert advice, apply clear guidelines, and
decide accordingly whether the
77 product's design is an acceptable compromise
of competing considerations.1

Connecticut, as we explained earlier, has formally rejected the
Products Liability Restatement test for design defect. Yet it limits its
consumer expectations test to cases where an ordinary consumer is "able
to form expectations of safety.' 78 In cases involving issues of complex
product design, the court admits that risk-utility balancing must be
utilized in order to decide whether a design is defective. As noted
earlier, in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 1 79 the seminal
Connecticut case pronouncing this two-prong analysis, the plaintiff
presented evidence of several reasonable alternative designs that were
readily available and that would have minimized or eliminated the injury
to the plaintiff. Since Potter, the Connecticut cases in which the
consumer expectations test has been applied by state and federal courts
are all res ipsa-like cases in which the inference of defect was entirely
appropriate under section 3 of the Restatement. 8 '
175 Id. at 309.
176 Id. at308n.3.
177
178

Id.at 308 n.4.
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).

179 Id.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. DENT-X Int'l, Inc., No. 3:05CV1019 (TPS), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20858 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2007); Moran v. E. Equip. Sales, Inc., 818 A.2d 848 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2003); Martone v. C. Raimondo & Sons Constr., No. CV000704975S, 2002 WL 31234758
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002).
180
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Tennessee's Product Liability Act embraces a two-prong test for
design defect similar to the tests in Arizona and California. In Jackson v.
General Motors Corp.,181 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
consumer expectations test was not limited to the malfunction of simple
products but could apply to complex products as well. It will be noted,
however, that the court also observed that "plaintiffs, in cases involving
highly complex products," will often be unable "to establish that the
product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by an ordinary consumer."' 82 This caveat was applied in
Brown v. The Raymond Corp.'83 where a plaintiff was driving his forklift
when he collided with a forklift driven by another employee. The wheel
well of the other employee's forklift entered the operator compartment of
the plaintiffs forklift, crushing his left foot. Plaintiffs expert testified
that the defendant's forklift was defectively designed because the
company could have eliminated the hazard of its forklift's wheel
intruding into the compartment of another. The trial court found that the
plaintiffs expert testimony did not meet Daubert standards and was
inadmissible.'84 Plaintiff argued that even though he had not satisfied the
risk-utility prong for design defect, he was entitled to take the case to the
jury under the consumer expectations test.'85 In rejecting the plaintiffs
argument, the court noted that, notwithstanding the broad language in
Jackson that the consumer expectations test could be applied to complex
products, the requirement that the product be more dangerous than
expected by the ordinary consumer could not be met in this case.'86 The
complexity of the product would not allow for such an inference of
defect.
We need not deluge the reader with cases in which the courts
have held that the consumer expectations test is inappropriate and the
case requires risk-utility balancing. If one needs reminding, the Soule
case in California was a crashworthiness case in which the court held that
the consumer expectations test was improper and required risk-utility
balancing.'87 As we see it, most cases in which the courts have imposed
liability under consumer expectations and have not required risk-utility
balancing are cases that would have met the test set forth in section 3 of
the ProductsLiability Restatement. A few cases may be found in which
courts, in our opinion, have given an overly broad reading to the

181
182
183

184
185
186
187

60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001).
Id.at 806.
432 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005).

1d.at 642-43.
Id.at 644.
Id.
Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309 (Cal. 1994) ("Unless the facts actually

permit an inference that the product's performance did not meet the minimum safety expectations of
its ordinary users, the jury must engage in the balancing of risks and benefits ....
").
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consumer expectations test.'88 Would results in those states that have
given a broader reading to consumer expectations than is to our liking
have been different had the court applied the language of section 3? That
is hard to tell. The res ipsa doctrine has had an accordion-like quality to
it and courts have at times given it an expansive reading.'89 One fact is
undeniable. Those courts that have opted for a two-prong test for design
defect manifest by that doctrinal choice that they understand that the
consumer expectations test has serious limitations and cannot be the
exclusive test for design liability. Although we do not formally count
them as states that agree with the Products Liability Restatement, the
reality is that when one considers sections 2 and 3 together and lines
them up with the law of: (1) the states that require proof of a reasonable
alternative design; (2) the states that profess to apply risk-utility
balancing; and (3) the two-prong states, the consensus that support the
general approach of the Products Liability Restatement is overwhelming.
We never anticipated that we would persuade states to speak in the same
dialect. But they are, in fact, speaking in one common language.
F.

The Pure Consumer Expectation States

A handful of states embrace the consumer expectations test as
the sole standard for defect. Thus, Kansas, 9 ' Maryland,' Nebraska,'92
Oklahoma,' 93 and Wisconsin'94 all profess allegiance to the consumer
188 See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1995) (plaintiff
was injured when her car was rear-ended and the air barg inflated in a low speed collision; court held
that plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on consumer expectations theory and that risk-utility
evidence as to the effectiveness of air bags was not relevant); Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d
103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (consumer expectations test appropriate for injury allegedly caused by
a defective seatbelt shoulder harness). But see Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4 (Ct.
App. 1999) (On facts similar to Breshnahan, the appellate court upheld a trial court finding that the
consumer expectations test was inappropriate.). For other cases indicating that California courts
generally read the consumer expectations test narrowly, see HENDERSON AND TWERSKI, supra note
9, at 287.
189 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 2.5; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 154-55 (2000); PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (1984); HENDERSON
& TWERSKI, supra note 9, at 176.
190 See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000). Answering a certified
question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Kansas high court announced that
it rejected the Restatement (Third) standard and "adopted the consumer expectations test ....
" Id. at
946. It should be borne in mind that in Delaney, the plaintiff had clearly proven a reasonable
alternative design case sufficient to reach the jury under the Restatement (Third) section 2(b) test.
191 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
192 See Haag v. Bongers, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Neb. 1999) (approving earlier case law
that refused to require plaintiffs to prove a reasonable alternative design); Kudlacek v. Fiat, S.p.A.,
509 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Neb. 1994); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Neb. 1987).
193 In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Okla. 1974), the court
adopted the consumer expectations test. There is a dearth of Oklahoma cases utilizing the consumer
expectations test in classic design defect cases. The consumer expectations test has been applied to
section 3 res ipsa-like cases. See, e.g., Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 190 (Okla.
1992).
194 In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794
(Wis. 1975), Wisconsin adopted the consumer expectations test. More recently, in Green v. Smith &
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expectations test. In the case of Maryland there is good reason to believe
that the issue is not settled and that risk-utility balancing will ultimately
prevail in classic design defect cases.
For almost two decades, Maryland utilized risk-utility balancing
and required proof of a reasonable alternative design to make out a prima
facie case of design defect.'95 Then, in what appeared to be an abrupt
reversal in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,'96 the Supreme Court
embraced the consumer expectations test. Plaintiffs' decedent, a threeyear old boy, shot himself while playing with his father's handgun. The
gun was sold with a lock box in which to store the gun, the magazine,
and a padlock for the box. The instruction manual set forth multiple
warnings about storing the handgun with special cautionary instructions
about storing the gun away from children. There were also warnings that
ammunition should be stored separately from the firearm. The boy's
father disregarded virtually every one of the warnings. Rather than
putting the gun in the lock box, he placed it under his mattress and kept
the loaded magazine on a bookshelf in the same room so that it was
visible and accessible to his son. The child found the gun and the
magazine. From watching television he knew how to load the magazine
into the gun. While playing with the loaded handgun, he shot and killed
himself.
Plaintiff alleged that the gun was defective and unreasonably
dangerous, suggesting a host of alternative designs that would have
substantially reduced the likelihood that a young child could fire the
gun.'97 After a lengthy discussion of earlier Maryland cases, the court
concluded that it would not apply a risk-utility standard to handguns and
would bar the action because the gun met consumer expectations. The
court said:
It is clear that under the consumer expectations test that ... no cause of action
had been stated in this case. There was no malfunction of the gun; regrettably it
worked exactly as it was designed and intended to work and as any ordinary
consumer would have expected it to work. The gun is a lawful weapon and was
lawfully sold. What caused this tragedy was the carelessness of [the] father in
leaving the weapon and the magazine in places where the child was able to find
sense but of multiple warnings
them, in contravention not only of common
8
given to him at the time of purchase.19

Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 2001), the court reiterated its support for the
consumer expectations test and rejected the section 2(b) standard of the Products Liability
Restatement.
195
See, e.g., Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1981)
(applying Maryland law); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 707 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
196 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002).
197 Id. at 1148.
198 Id. at 1158.
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The court then noted that, given the controversy surrounding the riskutility standard of the Products Liability Restatement and given the fact
that the legislature had enacted its own standard for the sale and
distribution of handguns, it would not adopt the risk-utility test for
handguns.'99
Although the consumer expectations test is generally considered
to be more favorable to plaintiffs, a rigorous application of the test as the
sole grounds for deciding defect would result in negating legitimate
plaintiffs' claims when a product satisfies consumer expectations,
perhaps because the risks are obvious, but could be made safer by
adopting reasonable alternative designs.20 0 Nonetheless, in comments
written shortly after Halliday, we predicted that Maryland courts would
revert to risk-utility balancing in classic design defect cases by declaring
that consumers have a right to expect reasonably designed products.20 '
Several post-Halliday cases have proven our prediction to be accurate.0 2
Although the consumer expectations test may occasionally be used as a
shield against liability, when the issue is whether a product was
reasonably designed, Maryland courts will resort to risk-utility balancing
and will not simply allow a plaintiff to recover based on disappointed
consumer expectations.
CONCLUSION

One may quibble with our assessments here and there regarding
whether one state or another has fully adopted risk-utility/reasonable
alternative design as the standard for design defect liability. But in the
broad view of the national landscape set forth in this Article, there is
little doubt that risk-utility balancing has carried the day. 0 3 The
199 Id. at 1159 ("Given the controversy that continues to surround the
risk-utility standard
articulated for design defect cases in § 2 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), we are reluctant at this point
to cast aside our existing jurisprudence in favor of such an approach on any broad, general basis ....
So far, the Legislature has chosen not to place these burdens on gun manufacturers but has attempted
to deal with the problem in other ways. We shall respect that policy choice.").
200 Clayton v. Deere & Co., No. 05-3377, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47371 (D. Md. June 27,
2007) (summary judgment granted to defendant against claim that a lawnmower was defectively
designed because dangers were known to a reasonable consumer); Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1158.
201 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:

PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 266-67 (5th ed. 2004).
202 Higginbotham v. KCS Int'l, 85 F. App'x 911 (4th Cir. 2004) (utilizing risk-utility

balancing in deciding that swim ladder of a yacht was not defectively designed); Celmer v.
Jumpking Inc., No. 04-3959, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34104 (D. Md. May 26, 2006) (denying motion
for summary judgment to manufacturer of trampoline relying on risk-utility balancing to show that
an alternative design was available that would have prevented plaintiff's injury); Hoon v. Lightolier,
L.L.C., 857 A.2d 1184, 1195-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (discussing use of risk-utility balancing
in Maryland design defect litigation and citing to section 2(b) of Products Liability Restatement),
rev'don other grounds, 876 A.2d 100 (Md. 2005).
203 The issue is still unclear in only six states: Pennsylvania, Idaho, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, and Vermont.
Whether Pennsylvania will adopt section 2 of the ProductsLiability Restatement will
shortly be decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The issue is before them in Bugosh v. I.U.
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North America Inc., 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008). In South Dakota, the superior court, in Engberg
v. Ford Motor Company, 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973), adopted section 402A. We have found no
cases interpreting the standard for design defect in classic design defect cases.
The case law on design defect in North Dakota is similarly sparse. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 28-01.3-05 to 28-01.3-06(4) (2006) set forth the consumer expectations test as the test for defect.
The first case, see Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974), involved a driver and
passenger of an automobile who were incinerated when the gasoline tank exploded when struck from
behind by another automobile. Id at 59. The lower court granted summary judgment for the
manufacturer, holding that the manufacturer was under no duty to make the automobile accidentproof Id. at 62. On appeal, the high court reversed and remanded, indicating that the issue-whether
a reasonable alternative design to the gasoline tank would have prevented the injury-was for the
trier of fact. While the high court in Johnson adopted strict liability in tort, the standard applied was
negligent design. Id. at 65. The second case, see Endresen v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc.,
560 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1997), involved a man who was permanently blinded in his right eye when
his handgun exploded when he attempted to shoot an overloaded cartridge. Id. at 227. The lower
court, without a jury, granted judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $259,079.21. Id. An expert
for the plaintiff testified that the use of reloaded ammunition was a common and foreseeable
practice, Id. Further, the expert testified that other brands of firearms were designed to withstand
reloaded ammunition. Id. Given that there is no judicial interpretation of the statute and that the few
cases dealing with design defect were supported by reasonable alternative design, we believe that the
standard for design defect is undecided in North Dakota.
Many Idaho cases deal with the issue of when courts may draw an inference of defect
without having to prove a specific defect. These are invariably res ipsa-like cases that are totally
consistent with section 3 of the Products Liability Restatement. See, e.g., Fitting v. Dell Catalog
Sales USA, No. CV-06-23-S-LMB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41946 (D. Idaho May 21, 2008);
Bachman FXC Corp., No. CV-06-140-2-JLQ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20938 (D. Idaho Mar. 21,
2007); Mortenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 693 P.2d 1038 (Idaho 1984). Few cases deal with the
standard of design defect. Aside from noting that Idaho adopted section 402A for both
manufacturing and design defects, see Rindilsbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421 (1974), the cases do not
address the standard for design defect. However, in Pate v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 930 F. Supp.
451 (D. Idaho 1996), plaintiffs hand was crushed when he sought to break up a jam in a block
splitting machine. Plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively designed in that it did not have a
guard that would have prevented the accident. In rejecting plaintiffs claim the court said that
plaintiff's counsel "did not point the Court to any expert testimony concerning such a guard, and did
not refer to any ANSI standard that would require such a guard. In the absence of such evidence, the
Court is left to speculate as to the feasibility, cost, function, availability and suitability of such
modifications to the machine." Id. at 460; see also Curtis v. DeAtley, 663 P.2d 1089 (Idaho 1983)
(housekeeper injured when the chandelier she was cleaning fell on her; court reversed trial court's
grant of directed verdict against the distributor because the plaintiff's expert suggested two
alternative designs that would have prevented the accident).
Wyoming has few cases discussing the issue of the standard for deciding design defect
cases. However, in Campell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 1998), the court cited to the
text of section 2(b) in deciding a design defect case. Plaintiff had been thrown from an asphalt
compactor and was killed with the compactor rolled over him. Plaintiff's expert posited an
alternative design on the grounds that the expert's testimony was insufficient to support the
proposition that the alternative design was practical. After citing to section 2(b) the court said:
The requirement that plaintiff show the existence of a reasonable alternative design as an
element of her claim has been the subject of extensive debate. Comments b and e to this
section, however, suggest an alternative design may not be necessary in every design
defect case. We need not enter the debate at this time because Campbell's allegations
clearly rest on her contention that a feasible alternative design was available.
Id. at 392 n.1. It is important that the court noted to the comments to section 2(b) that indicate that
the Products Liability Restatement does not always require proof of a reasonable alternative design.
This would indicate that the court understands the subtlety of the Restatement and would be more
likely to adopt it. Nonetheless, in our opinion, we would categorize Wyoming as a state that is
leaning toward adoption of Restatement section 2(b) and its comments.
Not many Vermont cases, both on the state and federal level, deal directly with the
standard for design-based liability. Vermont adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in 1975,
in accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Zaleskie v. Joyce,
333 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Vt. 1975). Subsequent high court decisions indicate that design-based
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overwhelming majority of cases that rely on consumer expectations as
the theory for imposing liability do so only in res ipsa-like situations in
which an inference of defect can be drawn from the happening of a
product-related accident. We do not disagree with those holdings.
Indeed, section 3 of the Products Liability Restatement enthusiastically
supports the principle that there is no need to prove a reasonable
alternative design when a product fails to perform its manifestly intended
function."°
Putting legal theory aside, the simple reality is that plaintiffs
base their design defect claims on the availability of a reasonable
alternative design. They are compelled by logic to do so. They must be
able to explain to juries what is wrong with a product. The only way to
do so is to posit a better, safer design. When their experts falter in
providing credible evidence that a reasonable alternative design was
available, they almost always face Daubert challenges. If they do not
survive the Daubert challenge, they cannot fall back on the consumer
expectations test. Where plaintiffs cannot establish product malfunction
they must establish that the product failed to meet the risk-utility
standard. They live or die by their ability to establish a reasonable
alternative design. The test for design defect set forth in the Products
Liability Restatement merges sound legal theory and actual litigation
practice. It will stand the test of time.

jurisprudence in Vermont remains largely undeveloped. See Farnham v. Bombardier, Inc., 640 A.2d
47 (Vt. 1994); see also Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1996). Farnham
involved a plaintiff who suffered a head injury when he was thrown off his snowmobile while
driving at high speeds. Farnham, 640 A.2d at 48. Plaintiff claimed that the snowmobile was
defectively designed with regard to its ability to break at high speeds. Id. The lower court granted
summary judgment for the defendant in a strict products liability action. Id. On appeal, the high
court affirmed, citing the open and obvious nature of the risk involved in addition to the failure of
the plaintiff's expert to establish a design defect. Id. at 49. The high court did not address nor expand
upon any of the customary design-based tests.
204 See supra note 151.
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